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#### GOP will give into *political pressure* but it’ll be a fight

Sargent 10-30-13 GREG SARGENT . Washington Post “Immigration reform is definitely undead” [http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/30/immigration-reform-is-definitely-undead/] [MG]

We now have three House Republicans who have signed on to the House Dem comprehensive immigration reform bill, putting immigration reform officially back in the “undead” category. GOP Rep. David Valadao of California is officially on board with the bipartisan proposal, according to a statement from the Congressman sent my way: “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year. “By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.” Valadao’s move is not wholly unexpected, given that he inhabits a moderate district with a lot of Latinos. But his insistence that addressing immigration reform “cannot wait” is helpful. It seems like an implicit message to the GOP leadership: We must act this year, and on this bill, if necessary. This comes after GOP Reps. leana Ros-Lehtinen and Jeff Denham did the same. Denham has said he expects “more” Republicans to ultimately sign on, and has also said that the House GOP leadership told him there will be a vote on something immigration-related by the end of the year. It’s unclear whether there will actually be a House vote on anything involving immigration before the year runs out, and it seems very unlikely that there will be a vote on the House Dem measure, which is essentially the Senate comprehensive immigration reform bill, without the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment that House Dems dislike, and instead with another border security amendment House Dems like swapped in. However, the movement among Republicans towards the Dem bill — even if it is only a trickle for now — is interesting, as a reminder that immigration reform can happen if House GOP leaders actually want it to. To be sure, immigration reform faces a huge obstacle: The stark underlying structural realities of the House Republican caucus. Far too few Republican members have large enough Latino populations to impact the outcome in 2014. With primaries coming, there just may be no incentive for Republicans to act until after the 2014 elections. But there are other factors to consider. In some key respects, immigration reform poses its own unique set of political challenges and conditions — it is not quite as polarizing an issue as, say, Obamacare or even the question of whether to agree to new revenues as part of a budget deal. Major GOP aligned constituencies — the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, evangelicals, high tech and agricultural interests in the districts of House Republicans – want immigration reform. What’s more, there is a built-in incentive for Republicans to put this issue behind them, given the slow forward march of demographic realities. Also, as longtime immigration operative Simon Rosenberg explains, Congressional Republicans have a long history of working on this issue. And some polls show that even sizable chunks of Republican voters want comprehensive reform, particularly if it is packaged with border security (Republican pollster Whit Ayres’ research, in particular, has shown that even GOP primary voters want action when informed that the other option is the status quo or “de facto amnesty,” as some pro-reform Republicans put it. Indeed, if there is anything that can make something happen, it’s the possibility that inaction is far more difficult politically for Republicans than many of them (and many commentators) claim. The immigration problem — “de facto amnesty” is not going away. If more Republicans like these three urge action inside the GOP caucus, it’s not impossible that House GOP leaders will allow votes on border security, the Kids Act, or potentially the legalization proposal that Republicans are said to be working on. That could possibly get us to conference. Yes, immigration reform remains decidedly undead.

#### PC Is Key to Getting the *Essential Parts* of the Bill Through

Anderson Robichaud October 25, 2013. n behalf of Robichaud, Anderson & Alcantara P.A. posted in US Immigration Law on “Beyond The Poisoned Well” http://www.robichaudlaw.com/blog/2013/10/beyond-the-poisoned-well-immigration-reform-tactics-changing.shtml

President Obama has not given up on enacting comprehensive immigration reform. ¶ To be sure, there is concern in Washington, DC and around the country that the partisan wrangling over the partial federal government shutdown "poisoned the well" of good will that may be needed to get the president and both chambers of Congress to agree on a specific proposal.¶ That is one reason why it may be necessary to break up the proposal passed by the Senate earlier this year into several different smaller bills. The smaller bills could tackle specific issues such as work visas or family immigration.¶ This week, there were indications that President Obama may be coming around to that point of view.¶ After the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration bill in June, the hope was that the U.S. House of Representatives would take up that bill. But the House did not do so. And now, after the passage of several months and the reality-check of the shutdown, the president appears to be shifting his tactics.¶ President Obama said this week that he is open to proposals from Republicans about possibly dividing up an immigration overhaul into several separate parts.¶ In political terms, it may be more practical to pass one or more of those parts than to keep holding out for a comprehensive reform that addresses all of the issues, all at once.¶ Of course, in either form -- either comprehensive or broken into separate parts -- it will take considerable political capital and probably some (often elusive) compromise to actually pass immigration reform. But President Obama is clearly still committed to making such reform one of the top priorities of his second term.

#### Economic Policies Unpop – Public and Congress

**Wilson ‘13**

Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Reform’s key to heg

Nye 12 Joseph S. Nye, a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye

CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small number of Native Americans, everyone is originally from somewhere else, and even recent immigrants can rise to top economic and political roles. President Franklin Roosevelt once famously addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution – a group that prided itself on the early arrival of its ancestors – as “fellow immigrants.”¶ In recent years, however, US politics has had a strong anti-immigration slant, and the issue played an important role in the Republican Party’s presidential nomination battle in 2012. But Barack Obama’s re-election demonstrated the electoral power of Latino voters, who rejected Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney by a 3-1 majority, as did Asian-Americans.¶ As a result, several prominent Republican politicians are now urging their party to reconsider its anti-immigration policies, and plans for immigration reform will be on the agenda at the beginning of Obama’s second term. **Successful reform will be an important step in preventing the** decline of American power**.**¶ Fears about the impact of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity are not new. The nineteenth-century “Know Nothing” movement was built on opposition to immigrants, particularly the Irish. Chinese were singled out for exclusion from 1882 onward, and, with the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, immigration in general slowed for the next four decades.¶ During the twentieth century, the US recorded its highest percentage of foreign-born residents, 14.7%, in 1910. A century later, according to the 2010 census, 13% of the American population is foreign born. But, despite being a nation of immigrants, more Americans are skeptical about immigration than are sympathetic to it. Various opinion polls show either a plurality or a majority favoring less immigration. The recession exacerbated such views: in 2009, one-half of the US public favored allowing fewer immigrants, up from 39% in 2008.¶ Both the number of immigrants and their origin have caused concerns about immigration’s effects on American culture. Demographers portray a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. Hispanics will comprise 25% of the population, with African- and Asian-Americans making up 14% and 8%, respectively.¶ But mass communications and market forces produce powerful incentives to master the English language and accept a degree of assimilation. Modern media help new immigrants to learn more about their new country beforehand than immigrants did a century ago. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that the latest immigrants are assimilating at least as quickly as their predecessors.¶ While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population.¶ For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades.¶ Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to economic power: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation**, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US.**¶ In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition**, skilled immigrants can be important to** particular sectors – and to long-term growth. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies.¶ Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s soft power. The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. The US is a magnet, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US.¶ Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting hard and soft power, immigration enhances both.¶ Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely **because the US attracts the best and brightest** from the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US.¶ That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting **immigration reform** in his second term, he **will** have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US.

#### Loss of hegemony causes global instability

Kagan 12, Senior Fellow at Brookings (Robert, 3/14/12 “America has made the world freer, safer and wealthier” CNN,<http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp_c1>)

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

## Coloniality Consumerism K

#### Commidification of resources forces enclosure and reliance on markets for livelihoods—that organizes society in ways that make livelihoods zero sum- the alternative is to reject the 1ac’s justification of neoliberal consumption

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2004**

(Massimo, “Opposing fetishism by reclaiming our powers: The Social Forum movement, capitalist markets and the politics of alternatives”, International Social Science Journal Volume 56, Issue 182, Wiley)

There is not the space here to discuss the processes of market creation. Suffice to say that it is possible to theorise them in terms of “enclosures” (Caffentzis 1995, De Angelis 2004b). To put it simply, enclosures refer to those strategies promoted by economic and political elites that “commodify” things. In general commodification is to turn resources that are held in common among communities, or exchanged as gifts among its members or across members of different communities, or administrated and distributed by central institutions (Polanyi 1944), into things that are bought and sold on the market, commodities. The “things” turned into commodities often represent important resources necessary for communities to reproduce their livelihoods, and their “enclosure” represents at the same time the destruction of those communities and their increasing dependence on markets, which in today's context are increasingly linked to global commodity chains. The consolidation, development and deepening of capitalism in our lives heavily depends on enclosures. Indeed, as others and I have argued, enclosures are a continuous feature of the capitalist mode of production (Caffenzis 1995, De Angelis 2004b, Parelman, 2000) Today, enclosures, the commodification of resources upon which people depend for their livelihoods, take many names. They may involve the dispossession of thousands of farming communities from land and water resources following international bank funding of dam construction, as in the case of the dam project in the Narmada valley in India or the Plan Puebla Panama in Latin America. Or they may take the form of cuts in social spending on hospitals, medicines, and schools, or, especially in countries in the south, cuts in food subsidies so as to have money to pay interest on a mounting international debt. In all these cases, cuts, dispossessions and austerity, namely “enclosures”, are imposed for the sake of “efficiency”, and rationalisation and “global competitiveness”. Enclosures are therefore any strategy that push people to depend on markets for their livelihood. Enclosures only create a context for market social interaction to occur. If enclosures push people into increasing the degree of their dependence on markets for the reproduction of their livelihoods, then markets integrate their activities in a system that pits all against all. The increasing intensification of planetary interdependence brought about by global markets implies that any “node” of social production, at whatever scale – whether an individual on the labour market, a company in a particular industry, a city and country in competition to attract capital and investments vis-à-vis other cities and countries – faces an external force that forces it to adapt to certain standards of doing things, to adopt certain forms of social cooperation, in order to beat the competitor on pain of threat to its livelihood. But “beating the competitor” is also, at the same time, threatening the livelihoods of other communities we are competing with, to the extent that they also depend on markets to reproduce their own livelihoods. The more we depend on money and markets to satisfy our needs and follow our desires, the more we are exposed to a vicious circle of dependence that pits livelihoods against each other. Some of us win, and some of us lose, but in either case we are both involved in perpetrating the system that keeps us reproducing scarcity when in fact we could celebrate abundance. It must be noted that the competition that runs through the global social body is not similar to the competitive games we play with friends. When I play table football with my friends I aim at winning. But whether I win or lose, I end up sharing food and laughter with my friends, whether they lose or win. Competition in this realm is innocuous; it is a practice that might strengthen communities' playfulness instead of destroying it. But competition in the economy – whether “perfect” or “imperfect”, whether real or merely simulated (the latter being increasingly the case in public services where, in the absence of markets, government agencies simulate their dynamics by setting new benchmarks) – ultimately finds its very energy in its threat to livelihoods. It is a mode of social relation that is based on pitting livelihoods against each other. In so doing it continuously reproduces scarcity and community destruction. From the perspective of any “node”, this mode of articulation across the social body is disciplinary because, borrowing from Foucault's (1975) analysis of Bentham's Panopticon, or model prison, the market is also a mechanism in which norms are created through a social process that distributes rewards and punishments (see De Angelis 2002). By norms of production I am here referring to the variety of principles of allocation of resources and distribution associated with social human production, as well as ways of doing things, rhythms and forms of cooperation, that in capitalist markets are synthesised in prices. Norms of production (that is, ways of relating to one another) are answers to such fundamental questions as: what we shall produce, how we shall produce it, how much of it we shall produce, how long we should spend working to produce it, and who shall produce it – all very concrete questions that define process and relational questions concerning the reproduction of our social body and the ways in which we relate to each other and to nature. These questions are not answered by people themselves taking charge of their lives and relations among themselves; thus, equally, the norms of social production and of their relations to each other are not defined collectively. Instead they are defined by an abstract mechanism that we have created (actually, that states have created at sword-and gun-point: see Polanyi, 1944, and Marx, 1867, as classical accounts) and that we take as “natural” in the daily practices of our lives. It is the abstract process of disciplinary markets that articulates the social body in such a way as to constitute social norms of production, rather than individual social actors negotiating among themselves the norms of their free cooperation. In this market mechanism, individual actors must respond to existing heteronomous norms imposed by the blind mechanism of the market by meeting or beating the market benchmark (or the simulated market benchmark imposed by neo-liberalism's state bodies), an activity which in turn affects the market norm itself. In this continuous feedback mechanism, livelihoods are pitted against each other. When rewards and punishments are repeated in a system, norms are created. This is a process that the paladin of market freedom, Friedrich von Hayek, well understood, although he ignored the question of power and enclosure processes in explaining the emergence of capitalist markets. For Hayek, the abstract mechanism of the market is a spontaneously emerging system of freedom (De Angelis 2002).

## CP

#### The United States Secretary of State should order that the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review be modified to include prioritization of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. The United States federal government should implement the Review’s recommendations including any modifications to implementation. We’ll clarify.

This is the year for Kerry to decide whether or not to do a second QDDR; it’s not normal means and offers a chance to change policy without legislation.

Norris 13

John Norris, *Foreign* Policy, executive director of the Sustainable Security program at the Center for American Progress, 8/20/2013 “Foggy Bottom Review,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/20/foggy\_bottom\_review\_john\_kerry\_qddr

When he was a senator, he loved it so much that he thought it should be mandatory. But as secretary of state, will he be so sure?¶ I am referring, of course, to Secretary of State John Kerry and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, or QDDR.¶ A bit of history is in order. The QDDR is the grand strategic review of how America conducts its diplomacy and development through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The QDDR mimics the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, through which the Pentagon assesses its key strategies, programs, and resources every four years.¶ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, eager to put the State Department on more equal footing with the Department of Defense, announced the first-ever QDDR in July 2009. Clinton, who had grown familiar with the QDR process as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, argued that the QDDR would be the very epitome of "smart power," and would "help make our diplomacy and development work more agile, responsive, and complimentary."¶ Clinton recognized, as did many of her predecessors, that the architecture of America's diplomacy was more retro than modern, and the QDDR offered the promise of pushing through major reforms and presenting a policy vision without needing to get legislation approved.¶ But it also required a gestation period just shy of most elephants', taking 17 months to complete. During those 17 months, hardly a week went by when outsiders weren't told that the QDDR would be arriving "soon." As Josh Rogin noted in these same pages, the QDDR was first planned for release in March 2010 and then April 2010 and then September 2010, before it was finally released in December of that year. The actual QDDR report was a sprawling, but largely reasonable, document, and its findings would have generated an even warmer welcome if they had been delivered without such a lengthy wait. The Pentagon usually takes about half as much time to conducts its QDR, so the repeated delays gave the impression that the State Department had bit off more than it could chew.¶ Now, the speculation has begun as to whether or not Kerry will conduct the second-ever QDDR. Most think he probably will, but no official announcement has been made. For his part, Kerry almost has to lead a QDDR or else face an embarrassing climb down from his prior positions.¶ When Kerry was still in the Senate in 2012, he joined Sens. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ben Cardin (D-MD) in introducing legislation that would have made the QDDR mandatory. Although the bill did not pass, it would be difficult for Kerry to explain why he insisted on a QDDR from Capitol Hill but resisted it from Foggy Bottom. Such evolutions do occur when officials move from one end of Constitution Ave. to the other, and views on issues like executive privilege and congressional consultation obviously change depending on where you sit. But killing the QDDR would be a particularly stark example nonetheless. Kerry may also feel pressure to complete a QDDR during his tenure because his predecessor did, and the secretary seems to feel a measure of rivalry with Clinton.

#### Presenting the plan *in the QDDR* guarantees passage and avoids our politics links- allows plan to be spun as a strategic reinvestment rather than a standalone spending package- CP’s strategy is key to *sustain support for other soft power initiatives*

Burton and Lord 2011 (Brian M. and Kristin M., Bacevich Fellow and Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, Did the State Department Get the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Right?, The Washington Quarterly • 34:2 pp. 111-123, http://www.twq.com/11spring/docs/11spring\_Burton\_Lord.pdf)

Given that the QDDR identifies a number of strategic objectives and some wise investments for the future, but falls short in prioritizing and matching proposed means to ends, what is the best route forward? To implement smart reforms, the State Department and USAID will have to adopt one of three potential paths. First, if backed by a coalition of supporters in the Defense Department, corporations, and the non-profit community, State and USAID could redouble their efforts to build support for a greater investment in civilian power. While the political climate is not evidently hospitable to such an approach, it is nonetheless feasible to imagine a bipartisan coalition which would continue to invest in civilian power. If the administration chooses this alternative, which becomes less likely as candidates prepare for the 2012 presidential election, President Obama, senior administration officials, uniformed military leaders, and a coalition of other supportive voices would need to make a much clearer and more persuasive public case for diplomacy and development, explaining how the peace, goodwill, and economic prosperity they generate serve U.S. interests. Second, the State Department and USAID could circumscribe their ambitions. Given the resources allocated by Congress, it may simply not be possible to achieve all of the objectives laid out in the QDDR. If that is the case, Secretary Clinton should identify the highest priority components of the QDDR, make clear what is no longer possible, and she should be clear about the costs of such a re-alignment of resources and objectives. The State Department should not try to achieve what it knows it cannot deliver, and Congress should not hold it to a higher standard than it can possibly achieve without sufficient resources. Unless this trade-off is clear, politicians may not recognize that it is lack of resources, not just inefficiency or lack of skill, that hampers the performance of U.S. civilian agencies, and that this lack of investment holds real costs for the American people. Third, the State Department and USAID could seek creative new ways to match means to ends. Through bold leadership, streamlining operations, internal cost-cutting, and the more effective use of technology and innovative management techniques, these agencies could commit to achieving the objectives laid out in the QDDR without the prospect of significant new resources. There are many obstacles to such an approachincluding bureaucratic inertia, congressionally-imposed reporting requirements and regulations, powerful interest groups, and an organizational culture that may not be ready for sweeping changesbut these could be overcome with strong, focused leadership from Secretary Clinton. Regardless of which option the department ultimately chooses, Secretary Clinton and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah should embark on a rigorous budget reallocation exercise, akin to Secretary Gates’ recent proposal to seek internal budget efficiencies, in order to invest more in high priority modernization programs. Such an exercise at State and USAID would not only free up resources to invest in the priorities laid out in the QDDR, but also would build confidence on Capitol Hill that new resources would be spent wisely. Such an effort should include a complete review of seemingly mundane long-held business practices, such as how frequently Foreign Service Officers and their families rotate to new posts, and centralizing administration functions such as information technology and human resources, as is done in many global corporations.17

## Economy

#### No impact

Brandt and Ulfelder 11—\*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. \*\*Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network]

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship **to simultaneously address** the **possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity**. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.

#### Diversionary intervention will be peaceful and humanitarian, not a military conquest

**Kisangani and Pickering 11 - Professors PolSci KState,** (Emizet and Jeffrey, September, “Democratic Accountability and Diversionary Force: Regime Types and the Use of Benevolent and Hostile Military Force” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 55 No 6, SagePub)\*\*NOTE = SEI = SocioEconomic Interventions, PSI = PoliticoStrategic Military Interventions

As in Kisangani and Pickering (2007), we define benevolent military force as force used over low politics or what we term socioeconomic issues, typically in support of the target government and/or the target population. Examples of socioeconomic interventions (SEIs) include humanitarian relief operations and peaceful missions to safeguard minorities. These types of military interventions usually stand in stark contrast to what we term politicostrategic military interventions (PSIs), which are belligerent operations launched for ‘‘high politics’’ reasons of strategy and enhancing national power (see Souva 2005). Foreign military missions over disputed territory, regional balance of power concerns, or to topple foreign governments offer examples of PSIs. SEI may be an attractive option for diversionary leaders because it fits all of the criteria for successful agenda setting. 2 Most external uses of military force, including SEIs, are salient, headline grabbing issues (Peake 2001). They are also relatively noncomplex events, making it easy for the public to grasp. The fact that they occur infrequently accentuates their ability to impact the public consciousness and by extension the national policy agenda. Perhaps most importantly, because of their diversionary origins, they will command the unfaltering attention of the leadership in the political executive. Presidential or prime ministerial focus on an issue is a critical component of successful agenda setting, as is saturating the media with a consistent message. As Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2005, 135) point out, ‘‘When presidents prioritize an issue through their public statements—when they make a concerted effort to influence the agenda—they may have the most success affecting the agenda’’ (also Edwards and Wood 1999). This is why ‘‘. . . the president is an adept agenda setter when it matters most’’ (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005, 129). **SEI** is not only well suited for agenda setting, it **may often be preferred over PSI**. After all, political executives that launch military missions for diversionary purposes desire missions that have a high probability of success and little potential for unintended consequences (Levy 1989, 281; Fordham 2002, 576). Benevolent military missions sent to assist a target government in need will almost always entail less risk and less human cost than belligerent missions over high-politics issues. They will have a substantially lower probability of being reciprocated or evolving into fullscale war. 3 They consequently should stand less chance of producing casualties or embarrassing military setbacks. Perhaps because of this, SEI tends to be less likely than PSI to spark a public backlash against the administration or to provide political ammunition for its political opponents. Jentleson and Britton (1998), for example, demonstrate that humanitarian intervention, which corresponds roughly to the conceptualization of SEI, is one of only two forms of external military force that the US public will support for extended periods of time. If SEI garners the same type of public support in other democracies, **the appeal this policy option has for democratic executives contemplating diversion becomes clearer. Even if they would like to use PSI for diversion, some democratic leaders may not be able to**. A major thread of recent diversionary literature focuses on the ability that potential target states have to thwart diversionary uses of force by troubled leaders (Clark 2003). The strategic conflict avoidance thesis presumes that decision makers in states that stand a good chance of becoming diversionary targets alter their behavior to avoid diversionary military force. They tone down rhetoric, make significant conciliatory gestures, or take other visible steps to improve relations with the troubled and potentially diversionary actor, depriving diversionary leaders of opportunities to use force abroad. A number of recent empirical studies confirm that target states do at times behave in this way, particularly when the diversionary state is transparent and powerful (Clark 2003; Fordham 2005).

#### War for oil’s fiction – best ev disproves

Hossein-zadeh 09 An Iranian-born Kurd, Ismael Hossein-zadeh came to the United States in 1975 to pursue his formal education in economics. After completing his graduate work at the New School for Social Research in New York City (1988), he joined Drake University faculty where he has been teaching classes in political economy, comparative economic systems, international economics, history of economic thought and development economics. His published work covers significant topics such as financial instability, economic crises and restructuring policies, currency-trade relations, globalization and labor, international/sovereign debt, determinants of presidential economic policies, economics of war and military spending, roots of conflict between the Muslim world and the West, long waves of economic expansion and decline, and the Soviet model of non-capitalist development

The Political Economy of US Wars of Choice: Are They Really Oil Wars? Author: Hossein-Zadeh, Ismael Journal: Perspectives on global development and technology ISSN: 1569-1500 Date: 04/2009 Volume: 8 Issue: 2 Page: 295 DOI: 10.1163/156914909X423908

Despite the fact that oil companies nowadays view war and political turmoil in the Middle East as detrimental to their long-term interests and, therefore, do not support policies that are conducive to war and militarism, and despite the fact that war is no longer the way to gain access to oil, the widespread perception that every US military engagement in the region, including the current invasion of Iraq , is prompted by oil considerations continues. Th e question is why? Behind the Myth of War for Oil The widely-shared but erroneous view that recent US wars of choice are driven by oil concerns is partly due to precedence: the fact that for a long time military force was key to colonial or imperialist control and exploitation of foreign markets and resources, including oil. It is also partly due to perception: the exaggerated notion that both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were “oil men” before coming to the White House. But, as noted earlier, George W. Bush was never more than an ineff ective minor oil prospector and Dick Cheney was never really an oil man; he headed the notorious Halliburton company that sold, and still sells, services to oil companies and the Pentagon .

**Squo solves energy dependence**

Drezner 12, IR prof at Tufts, “Predictions about the death of American hegemony may have been greatly exaggerated”, January 22, <http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/22/predictions_about_the_death_of_american_hegemony_may_have_been_greatly_exaggerated>

A predicted decline in energy insecurity. British Petroleum has issued their Energy Outlook for 2030. The Guardian's Richard Wachman provides a useful summary: Growth in shale oil and gas supplies will make the US virtually self-sufficient in energy by 2030, according to a BP report published on Wednesday. In a development with enormous geopolitical implications, the country's dependence on oil imports from potentially volatile countries in the Middle East and elsewhere would disappear, BP said, although Britain and western Europe would still need Gulf supplies. BP's latest energy outlook forecasts a growth in unconventional energy sources, "including US shale oil and gas, Canadian oil sands and Brazilian deepwater, plus a gradual decline in demand, that would see [North America] become almost totally energy self-sufficient" in two decades. BP's chief executive, Bob Dudley, said: "Our report challenges some long-held beliefs. Significant changes in US supply-and-demand prospects, for example, highlight the likelihood that import dependence in what is today's largest energy importer will decline substantially." The report said the volume of oil imports in the US would fall below 1990s levels, largely due to rising domestic shale oil production and ethanol replacing crude. The US would also become a net exporter of natural gas. Note that this will take a while, and doesn't mean that the U.S. will be energy independent. Still, it's quite a trend. Or, rather, trends.

#### No US-China War

**Moss 13** (Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true)

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war woud be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

#### Senate unanimously approved the agreement

Geman 10/13 (Ben, “Senate clears bill to implement drilling pact”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/328235-senate-clears-bill-to-implement-us-mexico-offshore-drilling-pact>)

The Senate approved legislation Saturday to implement a U.S.-Mexico pact that would enable offshore drilling cooperation along a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. The bill to implement the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement quickly cleared the Senate by “unanimous consent,” avoiding a roll call vote. The drilling pact – which backers say would provide legal certainty needed to enable development along the Gulf boundary – has bipartisan support. But the Senate legislation differs from a House-approved version of the implementing bill. Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee's top Republican, cheered the Senate bill’s passage. “Today’s ratification of the transboundary agreement establishes important ground rules for developing the oil and gas reservoirs along our shared maritime border with Mexico. That in itself is an important step in improving our energy security,” Murkowski said in a statement Saturday. “But in addition to opening up nearly 1.5 million acres of the outer continental shelf, it also ensures that any exploration along our maritime border adheres to the highest degree of safety and environmental standards. I consider that a win-win for both countries,” she said. The House-approved bill gives companies operating under the U.S.-Mexico pact waivers from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments, drawing White House criticism. House leadership aides did not respond to an inquiry Saturday about whether they are prepared to accept the Senate plan. But a powerful oil industry lobbying group said in early October that it backed passage of the Senate plan that lacks the Dodd-Frank carve-out. The American Petroleum Institute has previously called for the Dodd-Frank exemption, but its support for advancement of the Senate plan could signal that advocates of the underlying drilling pact are willing to lay the House provision aside. And the landscape has changed since the House approved its version of the bill last June. The Securities and Exchange Commission is planning to re-write the Dodd-Frank regulation in question after a federal judge struck it down in July. The underlying U.S.-Mexico pact would make 1.5 million acres available for development that had previously been off-limits, and more broadly make the entire transboundary area more attractive to companies by ending legal uncertainties, according the Interior Department. In addition, enabling cooperation among U.S.-based companies and Mexican state oil giant PEMEX will “mitigate the safety and environmental risks that would result from unilateral exploration and development along the boundary,” a senior Interior official told the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in early October.

#### Compromise will happen- SQ does the aff

Boman 10/14 (Karen, “Senate passes US-Mexico Drilling Pact”, <http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/129582/Senate_Passes_USMexico_Drilling_Pact>)

While the Senate bill has bipartisan support, the Senate bill differs from the version passed by the House in June. The House version grants waivers for companies under the pact from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments, the Hill reported, while the Senate version does not offer such waivers, The Hill reported. A spokesperson for House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.,), one of the sponsors of H.R. 1613, said Hastings was hopeful that the House and Senate could work out a solution on the two bills passed to implement the pact, The Hill reported Monday.

## ADV 2

**No impact to Latin America**

**Naim 06 (Moises, Foreign Policy no157 40-3, 45-7 N/D 2006, editor of foreign policy magazine)**

For decades, Latin America's weight in the world has been shrinking. It is not an economic powerhouse, a security threat, or a population bomb. Even its tragedies pale in comparison to Africa's. The region will not rise until it ends its search for magic formulas. It may not make for a good sound bite, but patience is Latin America's biggest deficit of all. Latin America has grown used to living in the backyard of the United States. For decades, it has been a region where the U.S. government meddled in local politics, fought communists, and promoted its business interests. Even if the rest of the world wasn't paying attention to Latin America, the United States occasionally was. Then came September 11, and even the United States seemed to tune out. Naturally, the world's attention centered almost exclusively on terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, and on the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. Latin America became Atlantis--the lost continent. Almost overnight, it disappeared from the maps of investors, generals, diplomats, and journalists. Indeed, as one commentator recently quipped, Latin America can't compete on the world stage in any aspect, even as a threat. Unlike anti-Americans elsewhere, Latin Americans are not willing to die for the sake of their geopolitical hatreds. Latin America is a nuclear-weapons free zone. Its only weapon of mass destruction is cocaine. In contrast to emerging markets like India and China, Latin America is a minor economic player whose global significance is declining. Sure, a few countries export oil and gas, but only Venezuela is in the top league of the world's energy market. Not even Latin America's disasters seem to elicit global concern anymore. Argentina experienced a massive financial stroke in 2001, and no one abroad seemed to care. Unlike prior crashes, no government or international financial institution rushed to bail it out. Latin America doesn't have Africa's famines, genocides, an HIV/AIDS pandemic, wholesale state failures, or rock stars who routinely adopt its tragedies. Bono, Bill Gates, and Angelina Jolie worry about Botswana, not Brazil. But just as the five-year-old war on terror pronounced the necessity of confronting threats where they linger, it also underscored the dangers of neglect. Like Afghanistan, Latin America shows how quickly and easy it is for the United States to lose its influence when Washington is distracted by other priorities. In both places, Washington's disinterest produced a vacuum that was filled by political groups and leaders hostile to the United States. No, Latin America is not churning out Islamic terrorists as Afghanistan was during the days of the Taliban. In Latin America, the power gap is being filled by a group of disparate leaders often lumped together under the banner of populism. On the rare occasions that Latin American countries do make international news, it's the election of a so-called populist, an apparently anti-American, anti-market leader, that raises hackles. However, Latin America's populists aren't a monolith. Some are worse for international stability than is usually reported. But some have the potential to chart a new, positive course for the region. Underlying the ascent of these new leaders are several real, stubborn threads running through Latin Americans' frustration with the status quo in their countries. Unfortunately, the United States'---and the rest of the world's--lack of interest in that region means that the forces that are shaping disparate political movements in Latin America are often glossed over, misinterpreted, or ignored. Ultimately, though, what matters most is not what the northern giant thinks or does as much as what half a billion Latin Americans think and do. And in the last couple of decades, the wild swings in their political behavior have created a highly unstable terrain where building the institutions indispensable for progress or for fighting poverty has become increasingly difficult. There is a way out. But it's not the quick fix that too many of Latin America's leaders have promised and that an impatient population demands.

**Prolif solves war – empirics prove**

**Denney 13** (graduate at Yonsei University, Editor in Chief of Yonsei Journal of International Studies, citing Kenneth Waltz: American political scientist, faculty at University of California Berkeley and Columbia, prominent neorealist scholar in international relations, founder of structural realism, noted proliferation apologist (Steven, “His “Other” Legacy: Kenneth Waltz’s Defense of Nuclear Proliferation”, 5/21/13; <http://sinonk.com/2013/05/21/his-other-legacy-kenneth-waltzs-defense-of-nuclear-proliferation/>)

Kenneth Waltz, an IR giant, passed away last week. The professor was a mastermind mathematician and a genius logistician. A political scientist at both Berkeley and Columbia University and the founder of structural realism, he will be read by IR students for as long as there is an international system, and probably by historians once there isn’t. However, Waltz was also unabashed in his views and unwavering in the defense of theory, and thus hands down another legacy as well. Waltz’s formal legacy will likely be overshadowed, or at least closely followed, in the public arena by his logical but ultimately dogmatic defense of the spread of nuclear weapons. The set of arguments he laid out throughout the latter half of a prolific academic career provide all the reasons states such as North Korea need to defend the legitimacy of their nuclear weapons programs. They are reasons cited almost daily by KCNA and on the pages of Rodong Sinmun. Waltz belonged to a school of scholars who believe that the immutable forces of history and the structural constraints of the international system can be used to explain state behavior. At the most fundamental level, Waltz based his arguments on the unitary (state) model, whereby the state is made up of many parts but is approached, analyzed, and understood as one entity. As such, he posited the notion that individuals, institutions, and ideas matter little in the long run. What matters most is structure. In the current structure, Waltz asserts, states exist in perpetual anarchy and, as a result, rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security. **In the age of nuclear weapons this imperative necessitates the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent, and this is especially the case for states living with an existential threat from a nuclear rival.** In other words: North Korea. Many instinctively respond that this is bad for peace and stability; however, Waltz argued stubbornly to the contrary. In a monograph entitled “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” he used “rational deterrence theory” to contend **that peace and stability would be best served by “the gradual spread of nuclear weapons.”** A slow spread “is better than no spread or rapid spread,” he argued, writing: **Nuclear weapons have been the second force working for peace in the post-war world.** They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons. **Nuclear weapons have helped maintain peace between the great powers and have not led their few other possessors into military adventures.** Building on this argument in a debate with Scott Sagan in 2007 (moderated by Richard Betts), Waltz declared that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a fail-safe way for any country to protect its “vital interests,” meaning its sovereignty. If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. **That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than ﬁfty years.**

**New proliferators will build small arsenals – uniquely stable**

**Seng, 98** [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.203-206]

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

#### New arsenals aren’t destabilizing – small arsenals, no aggression, and deterrence solves

Forsyth 12 [James Wood Forsyth Jr., PhD, currently serves as professor of national security studies, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He has written on great-power war, intervention, and nuclear issues, “The Common Sense of Small Nuclear Arsenals,” Summer, Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/forsyth.pdf]

Whatever its logical shortcomings, it is important to stress that deterrence worked—it kept the Cold War “cold” and allowed international life to go on without a catastrophic nuclear war. After 70 years, **most analysts agree** on the basic dynamics of deterrence, and the contemporary debate regarding deterrence, when not addressing the problem of nonstate actors, tends to pivot on force structure considerations. 19 Here, the behavior of states with small nuclear arsenals is instructive. As previously mentioned, most states with nuclear arsenals have not acquired large numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead, they appear content with a relatively small arsenal **capable** **of** warding off an attack as well as dissuading others from interfering in their internal and external affairs. But of the two roles nuclear weapons seem to play—deterrence and dissuasion—is one more important than another? For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons play a decidedly deter­ rent role. But if one were to free Britain of its NATO obligations, who exactly would Britain be deterring today? What about France? Neither of these countries is as hard-pressed in the security arena as India or Pakistan, yet both hold on to nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons still “hold power at bay,” one must wonder whose power is being held at bay and how. It is important not to overinterpret this. Nuclear weapons serve a purpose. How else can one explain why nine states have them, while others appear to want them? But what purpose do they serve, in general? To answer that question, one must look at what nuclear weapons do for states. Among other things, nuclear weapons socialize leaders **to the dangers of adventurism and**, in effect, halt them from behaving or responding recklessly **to provocation**. 20 Statesmen may not want to be part of an international system that constrains them, but that is the system that results among nuclear powers. Each is socialized to the capabilities of the other, and the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution **despite** the composition, goals, or **desires** of its leaders. In short, nuclear weapons deter and dissuade.

#### Iran Prolif Solves Middle East Tensions and Risks of Retaliation

Ehsaneh Sadr, Dept of Government and Politics at Univ. Maryland 2005 Middle East Policy, Summer

In an article on U.S. options for a post- Cold War nuclear policy, Charles Glaser criticizes the work of foreign-policy analysts who “focus on a single criterion for evaluating U.S. security – the damage United States society would suffer in a war – but overlook other criteria for measuring U.S. security, specifically those criteria that measure the likelihood of war.”61 The same criticism might be leveled at Israeli security analysts whose preoccupation with the devastation a nuclear Iran could inflict upon the Jewish nation clouds their evaluation of the ways in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons affects the likelihood that Iran would initiate hostilities in the first place. The above analysis indicates that a nuclearized Iran is extremely unlikely to pose an existential threat to Israel. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction holds in the Iranian context: Iran’s clerical rulers, anxious to protect their own power, citizens and civilization, will not launch a war that will lead to their own destruction. Iran’s rulers are extremely unlikely to pass nuclear material on to terrorist actors whose loyalty they cannot ensure. They are also unlikely to step up conventional or terrorist harassment of Israel for fear of the escalation of hostilities to nuclear warfare**.** The impact of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weaponsupon Israel’s regional interestsis less problematic than one might think. Although the regime-change option would be off the table, it is not clear that it has ever been a feasible alternativegiven current geopolitical realities. Any increase in domestic political support for the Iranian regime is likely to be temporary**.** Iran may indeed be empowered to pursue its own regional interests, but such pursuit is not necessarily bad for Israeli interests. Finally, it will be many years before Iran’s weapons stockpile begins to approach Israel’s and the latter is compelled to engage in an expensive arms race. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Iran’s access to nuclear weapons may increase the prospects for regional stability and even Middle East peace. Given the horrendous consequences of an accidental nuclear war, it will be imperative that Iran and Israel develop some sort of ability to communicate with one another directly. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the institutionalization of such communications may be the first step in the normalization of relations between the two countries and the future integration of Israel into its neighborhood**.**

## ADV 3

#### Drug cooperation is high now and will continue to grow – Nieto and Obama’s meetings

**FNL 7/5** [July 5, 2013. Fox News Latino. “U.S. Wants More Intelligence Cooperation With Mexico, White House Report States” <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/05/us-wants-more-intelligence-cooperation-with-mexico-white-house-report-states/#ixzz2aos85oqW>**]**

A newly released White House report on the U.S. border with Mexico highlights the Obama administration's strategic shift toward forgoing a closer working relationship with its southern neighbor. This, despite recent restrictions by Enrique Peña Nieto's government on who American intelligence services can contact in Mexico. The White House's 2013 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy illustrated nine points that focus on interdiction, tackling drug cartels along the border, halting money laundering, building up stronger communities and strengthening ties between the two nations in terms of counternarcotics. “The U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship continues to grow based on strong, multi-layered institutional ties,” the report stated. “Based on principles of shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence, the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that continues to transform and strengthen the bilateral relationship in 2013 and beyond.” While the U.S. report touts a need for greater cooperation, new Mexican security policies could hamper that. A recent decision by the Mexican government has ordered a halt in direct communications between American intelligence agencies and their counterparts south of the border. Now instead of directly consulting local law enforcement, agencies like the DEA and FBI will have to contact Mexico's Interior Ministry before being passed along through the proper channels. Intelligence sharing, however, was a major talking point when President Barack Obama met with his Mexican counterpart back in May. Despite scarce details about the meeting, the two leaders discussed border security and the use of drones along the 1,954-mile shared border. Peña Nieto downplayed the notion that the new, more centralized arrangement would damage its security partnership with the United States. He said Obama agreed during their private meeting earlier in the day to "cooperate on the basis of mutual respect" to promote an efficient and effective strategy. "I think the U.S. government wants to make sure that Peña Nieto is on the same page as Obama, that he wants to pursue the cartels as consistently and aggressively as [former Mexican President] Calderón did during his presidency," Alex Sanchez, a security analyst at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, told ABC News. Even as the Obama administration hopes that Peña Nieto will continue to go on the offensive against the drug cartels in Mexico, the report suggests a more humanitarian approach to the drug war. Besides counternarcotics efforts, a solid portion of the report concerns community building measures along the border, ways to deal with substance abuse and violence, as well as health and education programs. “The crime and breakdown in public health and safety that affect many border communities has a close nexus with substance use —including abuse of alcohol and other drugs— can have a far-reaching effect on the resilience of communities,” the report stated. “Heavily Hispanic communities along the border have been particularly hard hit.” The report’s focus on community building seems to go along with Peña Nieto’s strategy in combating the drug war. Instead of the “kingpin” approach that his predecessor Felipe Calderón took, which focused on apprehending or killing high-ranking cartel members, Peña Nieto has moved to a plan to reduce the levels of violence in the country and bolster trust of law enforcement among the populace. The report has some analysts hopeful that there will be better working relations between the U.S. and Mexico, especially in light of the new rules concerning U.S. intelligence agencies. “The election of Peña Nieto sparked vocal concerns among U.S. political leaders over his stated desire to move priorities away from arrests and drug seizures, and towards violence reduction, and there have also been reports of tensions between the incoming government and U.S. officials over the level of U.S. involvement in Mexican security policies,” the Latin American intelligence website Insight Crime stated. “However, the U.S. strategy displays no sign of this friction, only expressing a desire to increase cooperation, which despite the public murmuring is likely to be the case.”

#### No impact to terrorism

**Mueller and Steward 12** (John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf)

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15

#### There is no risk of terrorism from Mexico- their evidence is a political scare tactic

Houston Chronicle, 3-28-11 (“Terrorism threat on Mexican border: Reality or political scare tactics?”, http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2011/03/terrorism-threat-on-mexican-border-reality-or-political-scare-tactics/)

An independent analysis by Vanderbilt political science and law professor Carol M. Swain and Saurabh Sharad found a 67 percent increase in the number of arrests of border crossers from suspect nations &#151 up from 213 in 2000 to 355 in 2009.¶ Yet none of these suspects has faced terror-related charges or carried out a terrorist act, according to senior federal law enforcement officials who have checked government records.¶ The single greatest terrorist threat to the United States remains al-Qaida affiliated recruits slipping through 327 airports and other ports of entry with legal or fradulent passports the way the 19 suicide hijackers gained entry to carry out the 2001 attacks.¶ Radicalized volunteers from countries that are not on any watch list remain an ongoing threat, as do self-radicalized U.S. citizens such as accused Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan, an Army psychiatrist charged with a rampage in 2009 that killed 13 and wounded 29.¶ Indeed, suspects in at least 24 of the 27 terrorist plots unmasked in the United States over the last two years have either been radicalized U.S. citizens or foreign nationals already residing in the United States.¶ “I’m not aware that anyone who has committed a terrorist act in the United States had crossed the southwest border,” a senior official with Immigration and Customs Enforcement told the Houston Chronicle, speaking on condition of anonymity.¶ “It’s an arduous trip through multiple countries to be smuggled across the southwestern border as opposed to using a passport, getting a visitor’s visa and just flying into any airport,” the official said.¶ None of Texas’ terror-related cases has involved a suspect who illegally crossed the U.S.-Mexico border.¶ Hasan was transferred to Fort Hood by the Army in 2009 before scheduled deployment to Afghanistan. Barry Bujol Jr., a U.S. citizen from Hempstead, Texas, was arrested in 2010 for allegedly trying to provide aid and equipment to al-Qaida affiliated terrorists.¶ And Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a 20-year-old chemical engineering student from Saudi Arabia, was studying in Lubbock on a student visa when he was charged in February with attempting to construct a bomb for potential targets including the Dallas home of former President George W. Bush.¶ “At this time, the Department of Homeland Security does not have any credible information on terrorist groups operating along the southwest border,” said spokesman Matt Chandler.¶ Yet many Texans remain concerned that prospective terrorists from watch list countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could hide among the tens of thousands of undocumented immigrants from Mexico and other countries who illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border each year.¶ “A porous U.S.-Mexico border presents an opportunity for terrorists to enter the U.S. undetected,” cautions Farenthold, the freshman GOP congressman from Corpus Christi.¶ “There are a lot of people crossing the border who came from scary parts of the world,” adds Sen. John Cornyn, R-San Antonio. “An individual with enough money and enough determination can penetrate our southwestern border and make their way into the United States.”¶ The intercepted suspects &#151 coupled with unknown numbers of border crossers who have evaded arrest &#151 highlight continued pressure on U.S. border security since the pre-9/11 arrest of Ahmed Ressam, an al-Qaida trained operative arrested with a trunk load of explosives in December 1999 as he tried to enter the United States from Canada to carry out a Millennium attack on Los Angeles International Airport.¶ Vast changes in security have been made since then, but Raymond Clapper, director of national intelligence, readily concedes the nation does not have “an iron-clad perfect system &#151somebody could get through.”¶ Unlike Ressam who was convicted of terrorism charges in federal court, apprehended “special interest aliens” invariably wind up in the immigration court system leading to expected deportation.¶ Jaziri, for example, who crossed into the United States from Mexico after Canadian authorities deported him back to his native Tunisia, faces a misdemeanor charge of unlawful entry into the United States. He also is being held as a material witness in a federal case against the Tijuana-based smuggling operation that allegedly received $5,000 to infiltrate him into the United States.¶ Federal officials said they could not make public or did not have available statistics showing the disposition of legal cases against suspects from the 35 watch list countries.¶ Only a fraction of the tens of thousands of visitors arriving at U.S. airports from those nations are subjected to screening beyond extensive database checks for “derogatory” information that could alert authorities to terrorism.¶ Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, for example, interviewed roughly 1,200 arriving airline passengers from the 35 listed nations in the past year, the senior ICE executive told the Chronicle.¶ “We look at individuals and travel patterns and (information) that we can develop on people as opposed to looking at all arrivals from certain countries,” the senior ICE official explained.¶ Mark Jones, chairman of Rice University’s political science department and a specialist in Latin American studies, says elected officials continue to raise the shadowy specter of terrorists crossing the border in hopes of gaining wider political support against illegal immigration.¶ “Talking about the threat enables politicians to define immigration in terms of protecting national security,” says Jones. “It’s political theater to say al-Qaida is going to come across if we don’t have a secure border.”¶

#### Status quo economic ties are high and resilient—that is sufficient to solve the advantage

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(Christopher, “Working Together,” Mexico Institute @ Woodrow Institute, Scholar)//BB

The economic ties between the United States and Mexico are reinforced by a large web of social networks. Thirty-two million U.S. residents, or one in ten, are of Mexican origin, including roughly 12 million people born in Mexico.10 Perhaps a million Americans live in Mexico, almost a fifth of all Americans who live abroad.11 Close to 15,000 Mexicans are pursuing college degrees in the United States, and 13 million Mexicans visit the U.S. in 2010.12 As the top tourist destination for U.S. travelers, an even larger 19 million U.S. residents visit Mexico each year.13 Just as social networks often facilitate the creation of commercial relationships within the United States, the depth and intensity of bilateral social integration spurs the development of economic links between the U.S. and Mexico. Import and export relationships, production sharing arrangements, and investment opportunities are all made easier by the relatively high level of understanding derived from the geographic and cultural proximity of United States and Mexico.

**Oceans resilient – they can’t kill off phytoplankton key to ecosystem functions.**

**Kunzig 07** – Award Winning Scientific Journalist Specializing in Oceans, Robert, Sweeping The Ocean Floor, Discover, Vol. 28

For all its unplumbed depths, the ocean is a rather simple machine. Light from the sun comes in at the top. Nutrients, primarily nitrogen and phosphorus, are brought from the land by rivers and are stirred up from the bottom mud by upwelling currents. Floating single-celled plants, the phytoplankton, take the sunlight and the nutrients and combine them with carbon dioxide to make organic matter. The single-celled plants are eaten by Zooplankton, which are then eaten by larger things, and so on, up to the familiar tuna and nurse sharks and gray whales. Floating in the water among all these things are myriad bacteria — there are perhaps a billion cells in every liter. These bacteria degrade dead plankton and fish excrement, recycling the carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, and other elements back into the water. Census scientists estimate that more than 90 percent of the 145 billion tons of life in the sea consists of microbes, either phytoplankton or bacteria. Some of the dead matter escapes the degrading microbes and sinks into the deeper, darker layers of the ocean. On the way down, it nourishes another population of animals — some fish, but also a huge array of gooey gelatinous things, known to their few scientific friends as jellies. Jellyfish proper, the medusae, are just one kind. They are familiar because they often venture into the shallows where humans paddle about. There are also the ctenophores, or comb jellies, with their eight rows of tiny rippling paddles; cylindrical salps that swim by jet propulsion; and floating snails that catch their food by casting large nets of mucus. Many of these animals are able to light up like fireflies — whether to scare off predators or attract a mate is not entirely clear. Descending in a submersible from the sunlit surface waters into the deep and utter dark of the abyss, one sees these bioluminescent flickers, like flashbulbs in a darkened concert hall. Then there is the bottom. The seafloor is not a single place; its topography is every bit as varied as that of dry land. A rugged chain of volcanic mountains, the midocean ridge, runs down the center of the Atlantic, around Africa into the Indian Ocean, between Australia and Antarctica, and across the South Pacific, then up the East Pacific to California, where it becomes the San Andreas Fault. The ridge rises as high as 15,000 feet above the surrounding abyssal plains. Here and there, those hilly plains are interrupted by underwater mountains called seamounts. In certain places along the rim of the oceans, especially the Pacific Rim, the seafloor descends abruptly into deep trenches. The most extreme, the Mariana Trench near the Philippines, plunges nearly seven miles, far deeper than Everest is tall. In 1960 Swiss explorer Jacques Piccard and American Navy lieutenant Don Walsh landed on its bottom in a primitive submarine, the Trieste, and looked out their tiny porthole for a few minutes. They saw a fish, or maybe it was a sea cucumber. There is life everywhere in the ocean, on every patch of ground, in every ounce of water. The deep seafloor is perfectly dark — sunlight is completely extinguished at a depth of 3,000 feet — and so it has no plants. Life there is sustained by the intermittent rain of dead organic matter from the surface waters. In places like the North Atlantic, where plankton bloom lushly in the spring, oceanographers find patches of green stuff on the ocean bed, a mile or two below. Sea cucumbers, one of the most common deep-sea animals, crawl through the stuff and vacuum it up. When a fish corpse reaches the bottom, every bit of flesh and bone is slowly scavenged by eel-like hagfish, starfish, and swarms of tiny crustaceans called amphipods. Even where the food is not so rich, the seafloor is not lifeless; everywhere it is churned by bristle worms and nematodes and pill-bug-like isopods. Life at the bottom may be sparse, but it is thorough. Every particle of mud passes through a worm gut several times at least. For more than a century, after deep-sea studies got going in earnest in the 1870s with the round-the-world expedition of the British ship Challenger, biologists thought that was all there was to it. Then in 1977, two geochemists — Jack Cortiss and John Edmond, diving in the submersible Alvin — discovered the first hydrothermal vent, or volcanic hot spring, on the ocean floor. They saw an astonishing scene around the vent. Clustered there, on the midocean ridge near the Galapagos Islands, were giant clams and mussels and six-foot-long tube worms, anchored to the ground and sticking upright. The tubes were white as ivory, with scarlet plumes at their tips that retracted as the sub approached. None of these species had ever been documented before. The strange organisms of the Galapagos rift turned out to be a whole new type of ecosystem. The base of their food chain was not plants that captured the energy of the sun but chemosynthetic bacteria that captured the energy of the volcano. Similar hydrothermal vent communities were eventually found at dozens of other points on the midocean ridge. Biologists, including some who had never thought much about the deep before, descended on them with fascination — and relief. It didn't take much work to convince the public and the funding agencies that these weird beasts were worth studying, so out-of-reach money suddenly became available. But in the ensuing rush, it was easy to forget that there was still a vast, cold, unknown ocean out there. Fred Grassle never forgot He had been one of the first scientists to get a good look at the Galapagos hot springs. A biologist from Rutgers University in New Jersey specializing in polychaetes — tiny caterpillar-like things, also known as bristle worms — he found himself staring out Alvin's porthole at tube worms almost as tall as he was. He was as amazed as anyone, but he soon went back to the larger problem of studying all the rest of the ocean. In the 1980s, he and his colleague Nancy Maciolek of Battelle Ocean Sciences in Massachusetts used a simple device called a box corer to collect undisturbed square-foot samples of seafloor mud. Judging from how many new species they found each time they lowered their device 7,000 feet onto the continental slope off New Jersey, Grassle and Maciolek estimated that there were up to 10 million animal species living on the ocean floor. If so, the deep was as diverse as the tropical rain forest. Grassle tried hard to get people excited about his work. He did not have much luck until he went to see Jesse Ausubel, who calls himself an environmental scientist and systems analyst but whose real talent is that he is a big-picture man, an organizer, and a congenital optimist. Early in his career he began studying environmental problems. "I'm going to be doing this for 40 years," he decided, "and I don't want to just go around saying Terrible things could happen.'" Terrible things are in fact happening to the ocean, as Grassle told Ausubel when they met. It was July 2, 1996, and they spent most of the day together in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, where Grassle had once worked at the Oceanographic Institution and where Ausubel has a summer office. A hundred miles to the east, on Georges Bank, the codfish stock had recently collapsed, as had the much larger one on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland; regulators had been forced to close both of those rich and historic fisheries. The amount we know about the marine species we depend on, Grassle told Ausubel, is minimal. The amount we don't know about the rest of the ocean, on the other hand, is astronomical. Ausubel took that as a challenge. The Sloan Foundation had recently sponsored a Digital Sky Survey — a systematic census of the stars. What did Grassle think, Ausubel asked, about doing a census of the fishes? Grassle thought it was a splendid idea, as long as it didn't get diverted into something strictly utilitarian — a census of seafood — and as long as it included all the other things that lived in the ocean, including obscure but biologically important organisms like polychaetes. The Census of Marine Life was born in 2000. "It is what it says it is," Ausubel says. "If you pick up any textbook, there isn't one that can tell you what lives in the ocean. From microbes to mammals, from near the shore to the open ocean, from the bottom to the top — what lives there. It's a very simple idea." Finding out what lives there doesn't just mean finding new species; it also means tracking the species we already know to find out where they go. Even highly visible marine animals lead invisible lives, far from shore or underwater or both. Stanford University biologist Barbara Block and her colleagues on a census project called Tagging of Pacific Pelagics are using microchips and satellite transmitters to penetrate those secrets. So far the researchers have tagged 2,400 animals belonging to 23 species. Some tags pop to the surface at a preset time, like a flare, and radio the animal's position back to the team via satellite. Other animals — sharks, elephant seals, whales, leatherback turtles — are equipped with tags that phone home each time the creatures surface. The tracking project's Web site contains a map of those animals' movements, a tangled mesh of colored lines that is updated daily. Such maps have revealed astonishing migrations. Bluefin tuna born in the Mediterranean cross the Atlantic to feed for a few years up and down the east coast of North America, mingling there with bluefins born in the Gulf of Mexico. Bluefins in the Pacific, on the other hand, feed off California for a few years before crossing the ocean to their breeding grounds off Japan — where a single one can fetch $175,000 on the Tokyo market. And white sharks, once thought to spend most of their time hunting seals and surfers off the California coast, actually head west in winter, to the open sea. For a few months, the sharks hang out in a patch of ocean near Hawaii that is low on food and any other obvious attraction. "My students call it the White Shark Café," Block says. But most of the ocean's diversity probably isn't hiding; it is teeming everywhere, undiscovered simply because it is so small. That is why Mitchell Sogin of the Marine Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole is directing the Census of Marine Microbes. The old way to search for microbial life in the ocean, he explains, was to isolate individual species by growing them in laboratory cultures. Biologists have identified around 5,000 species that way. But over the past 15 years or so, researchers have begun to realize that those 5,000 are just the hardy few that happen to be easy to keep alive in the lab. A newer, far less selective way of plumbing the ocean's microscopic diversity is to isolate individual genes, not individual microbes. Researchers use a small piece of the gene for ribosomal RNA, or rRNA — a gene that is distinct in every species — to grab all the rRNA genes that are present in a liter of seawater. Then they determine the sequence of as many of those genes as their grant money will, allow — typically around a thousand, coming from a thousand bacterial cells — and use that information to estimate how many different kinds of bacteria are present in the sample. Sogin is now supercharging this approach. By using faster sequencing machines and targeting only one highly variable part of the rRNA gene, he and his team can sequence 200,000 pieces of DNA from a single liter. As a result, the amount of diversity they find has soared. In one sample from the deep North Atlantic Ocean, they have found more than 60,000 kinds of bacteria. One intriguing discovery, Sogin says, is that in each sample he has studied so far there are always a few dominant kinds of microbes but also thousands more that are rare. Moreover, at each station — or even at different depths at the same station — there is a different suite of rare microbes. The large number of rare microbial species suggests that they have an important role in the oceanic ecosystem. Sogin suggests these rare species might function as a genetic archive, a fail-safe against environmental disaster. Over many millions of years, he explains, Earth has undergone repeated environmental cataclysms. "Global warming, asteroid impact, or whatever it is — those events threaten the survival of the microorganisms. This might be a way for them to cope," Sogin says. If there are tens of thousands of rare microbes floating in the water, all with different genes and correspondingly different abilities, there will always be a few that are adapted to the new environment. The dominant might become rare, the rare might become dominant, but the kingdom as a whole persists, albeit with an altered mix of species, which in turn alters the elemental cycles that determine the basic life chemistry of the sea.

#### No bio-d impact – it’s resilient

Kareiva et al 12 – Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter, Michelle Marvier **--**professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz **--** director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene/)

2. As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.¶ But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.¶ These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31¶ Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse.¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again.¶ The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.

**Species loss causes better-adapted species to evolve**

**Dodds 07** – MS in PE. President, North Pacific Research (Donald, The Myth of Biodiversity, http://northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The\_myth\_of\_biodiversity.doc)

Notice next that at least ten times biodiversity fell rapidly; none of these extreme reductions in biodiversity were caused by humans. Around 250 million years ago the number of genera was reduce 85 percent from about 1200 to around 200, by any definition a significant reduction in biodiversity. **Now notice that after this extinction a steep and rapid rise of biodiversity**. In fact, if you look closely at the curve, you will find that **every mass-extinction was followed by a massive increase in biodiversity**. Why was that? Do you suppose it had anything to do with the number environmental niches available for exploitation? If you do, you are right. **Extinctions are necessary for creation.** Each time a mass extinction occurs the **world is filled with new and better-adapted species**. That is the way evolution works, its called survival of the fittest. Those species that could not adapted to the changing world conditions simply disappeared and better species evolved. How efficient is that? Those that could adapt to change continued to thrive. For example, the cockroach and the shark have been around well over 300 million years. There is a pair to draw to, two successful species that any creator would be proud to produce. To date these creatures have successful survived six extinctions, without the aid of humans or the EPA.

**Studies and experiment prove**

Mertz et al **03** (Leslie, Biologist and veteran science writer, “Does greater species diversity lead to greater stability in ecosystems” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_gx5204/is\_2003/ai\_n19124307/pg\_7?tag=artBody;col)

Viewpoint: No, ecosystem stability may provide a foundation upon which diversity can thrive, but increased species diversity does not confer ecosystem stability. The hypothesis that greater species diversity begets heightened ecosystem stability may seem correct at first glance. Most people intuitively assume that the pond ecosystem has a better chance of thriving from year to year&#x2014;even in adverse conditions&#x2014;if it has a wider variety of species living there. That assumption, however, is supported by little scientific proof. On the other hand, many studies provide compelling evidence that diversity does not promote stability and may even be to its detriment. Several studies also suggest that if species diversity does exist, it is based on ecosystem stability rather than vice versa. One of the early experiments to critically damage the greater-diversity-equals-greater-stability argument came from the N. G. Hairston research group at the University of Michigan in 1968. In this study, the group created artificial communities of bacteria, Paramecia, and/or predatory protozoa grown on nutrient agar cultures. Each community contained more than one trophic level. In other words, the communities contained both predators and prey, as do the macroscopic food webs readily visible in a pond: A fish eats a frog that ingests an insect that attacks a tadpole that scrapes a dinner of bacterial scum from a plant stem. In Hairston&#x0027;s case, the researchers watched the combinations of organisms in a laboratory instead of a natural setting. Several patterns emerged. In one series of experiments, the researchers combined prey bacteria, which represented the lowest link in the food chain&#x2014;the first trophic level&#x2014;with Paramecium. The bacteria included Aerobacter aerogenes, and &#x0022;two unidentified bacilliform species isolated from a natural habitat.&#x0022; The Paramecium &#x2014;two varieties of P. aurelia and one variety of P. caudatum &#x2014;fed on the bacteria and so represented the second trophic level. As researchers increased the diversity of the bacteria, the Paramecia thrived and their numbers increased, at first suggesting that diversity caused stability. However, when the researchers looked more closely at the effects of increasing diversity on a specific trophic level, the story changed. They added a third Paramecium species to communities that already contained two species, and then watched what happened. The data showed that stability was based on which Paramecium species was introduced to which two pre-existing Paramecium species, and indicated that diversity in and of itself was not a requirement for stability. This set of experiments demonstrated that a higher number of species of one trophic level is unrelated to increased stability at that level. Finally, Hairston reported the repercussions that followed the introduction of predatory protozoa&#x2014;the third trophic level&#x2014;to the experimental communities. The predatory species were Woodruffia metabolica and Didinium nasutum . Regardless of whether the community held two or three Paramecium species, or whether the predators numbered one species or two, all Paramecia quickly fell to the protozoa, whole systems failed, and stability plummeted. In this case, at least, diversity did not generate stability. Although the Hairston research is based on an artificial system rather than a natural one, it represents credible, empirical evidence against the assertion that greater diversity yields stability. Over the years, numerous research groups have conducted similar laboratory experiments with the same results.

# 2NC

## Advantage 2

### Solves China

**Asian proliferation key to peace**

**Alagappa 09** – Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, PhD in International Affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Muthiah, “Nuclear Weapons Reinforce Security and Stability in 21st Century Asia”, Journal of the East Asia Foundation, Spring 2009, <http://globalasia.org/articles/issue9/iss9_17.html>)

Continuing emphasis on non-proliferation and calls for elimination of nuclear weapons notwithstanding, it appears likely that nuclear weapons will persist and influence national security policies and strategies of major powers, as well as certain second-tier powers and isolated states in the foreseeable future.1 Initial anticipation in the West especially in the arms control and nonproliferation community of the decreasing security relevance of nuclear weapons was ill-founded. The effort in the last decade and a half to arrest and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons has not been any more successful than earlier ones. Leaders and governments in nuclear weapon states, their allies, and aspirants to the nuclear club believe that their nuclear forces or those of their allies can advance national security. Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and strategic defense have entered or reentered the security thinking of the old, new, and prospective nuclear weapon states and their allies in a fundamentally different strategic environment and in a nuclear era that is substantially different from that of the Cold War. It is important to understand the security significance and roles of nuclear weapons in the new era, investigate national strategies for their employment, and explore their implications for international security, stability, and conflict resolution in the 21st century. This is particularly important in the broadly defined Asian security region which confronts serious security challenges and includes five of the seven declared nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan), one undeclared nuclear weapon state (Israel), two aspirant states (North Korea and Iran), and several states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia) that rely on the American nuclear umbrella for their security. The grim scenarios associated with nuclear weapons in Asia frequently rely on worst-case political and military situations and draw upon a certain view of the role of nuclear weapons in Cold War Europe or on the claim that Europe’s experience does not apply to Asia. Three contending views have been advanced on the consequence of nuclear weapons for peace and security in Europe during the Cold War. One view is that nuclear weapons contributed to the long peace and stability in Europe (Gaddis 1992; Jervis 1988; Waltz 2004). The second view does not contest the idea of a long peace but disputes that nuclear weapons contributed to it (Mueller 1988, 1998). The third view contests the claim that the Cold War was a period of stable peace. In this view, the nuclear standoff during the Cold War was highly dangerous and should be avoided. In terms of relevance for the contemporary era, some Western analysts (mostly nonproliferation scholars and advocates) argue that the contribution of nuclear weapons to the long peace in Europe would not apply to Asia. Asian countries are culturally different; their militaries view preventive war in a favorable light and are not interested in developing invulnerable strategic forces; and insecure command and control arrangements make them more prone to accidents and unauthorized use (Feaver 1992–93, 1993; Sagan 1994, 1995). Adherents of this perspective argue that the Indian, Pakistani, and most recently North Korean nuclear tests would set off a domino effect, with negative consequences for security and stability in Asia and the world. The view that nuclear weapons would contribute to insecurity and instability in Asia seems to have become dominant in the West. It resonates with and reinforces earlier views in Europe and the United States that Asia was ripe for rivalry and that its future would resemble the war-torn Europe of the nineteenth century (Buzan and Segal 1994; Friedberg 1993–94). MY ARGUMENT The primary argument of this article is that although there could be destabilizing situations, on net, nuclear weapons have contributed to peace, security, and stability in Asia. This argument is supported on the following grounds. First, nuclear weapons have not fundamentally disrupted the regional distribution of power or intensified security dilemmas. In fact by assuaging the security concerns of weak and vulnerable states **they promote stability in conflict prone dyads**. Second, fear of the devastating consequences of a nuclear exchange prevents the outbreak and escalation of regional hostilities to full-scale war, strengthens the political and military status quo, and impels conflicting parties to **freeze** the **conflict or explore** a negotiated **settlement**. Third, the combination of minimum deterrence strategies and general deterrence postures enhances stability among major powers and avoids strategic arms races like that during the Cold War. Finally, nuclear weapons reinforce the trend in the region to circumscribe and transform the role of force in international politics. The article further argues that the oftenposited destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons (dangers associated with new nuclear-weapon states, domino effect, preventive military action, and early use postures) have not materialized. There are indeed risks associated with nuclear weapons. However, they must be addressed on their own merits and not be advanced as a reason to deny the security relevance of nuclear weapons. The effort of the non-proliferation community to stop the spread of nuclear weapons on the basis of risks associated with nuclear weapons in the hands of “new” states generates an unproductive and futile debate. Arms are symptomatic of insecurity, not its cause. To be successful arms control policies must not only address the supply side but also deal with the demand side of the equation. The real cause of insecurity and armament lies in political disputes. Two clarifications are in order. One, I am not arguing that security and stability in Asia rests only or even primarily on nuclear weapons. As I have argued elsewhere peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia since 1979 rests on several pillars (Alagappa 2003a). Nuclear weapons strengthen that peace and stability by reinforcing deterrence dominance and further circumscribing the offensive roles of force. Second, I am not making the case for unlimited proliferation on the ground that more may be better (Waltz 1995). My case is that that proliferation thus far has been gradual and has not undermined peace and stability as predicted. In fact gradual proliferation has reinforced peace and stability in Asia. Preventing proliferation should continue to be a key goal of the international community; proliferators must face serious cost and supply obstacles. In such context only countries that feel severely threatened will pursue the nuclear weapon route and the acquisition process will necessarily be prolonged. The international community will have opportunities and measures to stop specific acquisition(s) and/or time to adjust to the changing nuclear situation. In addition to limiting and slowing proliferation, the nuclear order must be able to gradually accommodate new nuclear weapon states and promote deterrence and stability especially during potential moments of instability. Any attempt to freeze and rigidify the Cold War nuclear order will increase the gap between the formal regime and reality, weaken it, and possibly lead to its eventual collapse. I will deal with possible critiques of my argument later. First I will elaborate and support my primary argument that nuclear weapons have contributed to security and stability in Asia.

### Solves Heg

**Prolif solves the impact to heg – makes any transition stable  
Alagappa, 08** [Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 484]

The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major power relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining measures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balancing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and compellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. **They also render remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the region.** More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbalance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India’s confidence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with potential adversaries. Differences and disputes among them arc frozen or settled through negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strategic visions and policies, nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak of large—scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited.

### 2nc – Bioweapons

**Solving prolif causes a shift to bioweapons – only this creates effective weapons.**

**Zilinskas 2K**—Former Clinical Microbiologist. Dir. – Chem/Bio Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Raymond, Biological warfare: modern offense and defense, 1-2

It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of **b**iological **w**eapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our **perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change.** The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, **leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms** as the most accessible form of **w**eapon of **m**ass **d**estruction.

**Bioweapons cause extinction – nukes don’t**

**Singer** **1** (Clifford E., professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign, “Will mankind survive the millennium?” Bulletin of the program in Arms Control Disarmament, and International Security, 13:1, Swords and Ploughshares, http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/312/WillMankindSurvivetheMillennium.pdf)

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so called nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose **a more serious threat to human survival**. The first and most immediate **is biological warfare** combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

## Advantage 1

## No Impact - Econ

### 2nc – no impact

#### Global economy’s resilient---learned lessons from ‘08

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy coordination. As John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.”103 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime soon.

#### Multiple examples go neg

Fareed Zakaria 09 (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

### 2nc – at: Royal 10

**Royal concludes negative  
Royal 10** – director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, published in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books)  
There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate level **reduces the ability** of the state to coalesce a sufficiently strong political base **required to undertake costly balancing measures** such as economic costly signals. Schweller (2006) builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with decisions **not to balance** against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives; they will be least likely to enact bold and costly policies **even when their nation's survival is at stake** and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).

### 2nc – at: Gelb

#### He concludes great power war is largely obsolete

Gelb**, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, ’10** [Leslie H. Gelb was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, and he was a Columnist and Editor at The New York Times from 1981 to 1993. “GDP Now Matters More Than Force”, Published 2010 by Foreign Affairs in Washington DC, USA. Table of Contents A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Age of Economic Power, accessed: 7/13/13, ML]

The modern world has experienced two periods of globalization, both of which brought about new highs in trade and investment. Both sparked hopes that the common pursuit of riches would overshadow traditional military rivalries and sustain peace. The dreams of the first era, which lasted from 1880 to 1914, drowned in the blood of World War I, then World War II, and finally the Cold War--close to a century of war. Many expect that the current era of globalization, which began as the Cold War faded, will also end unhappily. Yet the current era differs from the past in three crucial ways: unlike the German empire of yesteryear, today's surging power, China, is unlikely to act as a spoiler; major powers and emerging powers today are less likely than ever to fight one another; and, consequently, nations can pursue their economic interests without the traditional overriding military worries.¶ In the pre-World War I era, Germany had the world's most dynamic economy, and the ambitions of German leaders greatly exceeded creating domestic wealth. They aimed to dominate the European landmass and beyond. The same was largely true of the Japanese empire before World War II, as it sought to rule Asia and much of the Pacific. Whereas most nations preferred to increase their wealth, Germany and Japan fixated on world domination and did not flinch from using force to achieve it. They were the world's most dynamic economies and also its spoilers. ¶ Skeptics today argue that China could be the second coming of those old and strategically greedy empires, but that argument is a stretch. The argument goes that contemporary China, like the Germany and Japan of old, will seek to dominate by money and trade if possible, and by force if not. To begin with, China today is far behind the former Germany and Japan in possessing the military wherewithal necessary to conquer, occupy, and command the resources of other states. Germany and Japan were able to fight most of the rest of the world for years. China is still decades away from having the capacity to project force--and sustain it--beyond its borders. In any event, worried nations, such as India, Japan, and the United States would have plenty of time' to react to and counter an aggressive China. ¶ Germany and Japan placed their industrialized economies at the disposal of their military ambitions. For them, the military domination of others was a cost-effective way to control resources, and it did not strain their internal control. China could not afford such an aggressive military strategy, as Beijing has to subordinate almost everything to upgrading its economy. Because half of China's population is still poverty-stricken--a reality with explosive, revolutionary possibilities--the Communist Party feels that it must produce economic growth to stay in power. ¶ Also reducing the likelihood of conflict today is that there is no arena in which the vital interests of great powers seriously clash. Indeed, the most worrisome security threats today--rogue states with nuclear weapons and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction--actually tend to unite the great powers more than divide them. In the past, and specifically during the first era of globalization, major powers would war over practically nothing. Back then, they fought over the Balkans, a region devoid of resources and geographic importance, a strategic zero. Today, they are unlikely to shoulder their arms over almost anything, even the highly strategic Middle East. All have much more to lose than to gain from turmoil in that region. To be sure, great powers such as China and Russia will tussle with one another for advantages, but they will stop well short of direct confrontation.

## No Impact – China

### 2nc – no war - generic

#### China wants a peaceful rise---any threats are just saber rattling---US also deters

Vu Duc ‘13 "Khanh Vu Duc is a Vietnamese-Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel and BBC Vietnamese Service, "Who's Bluffing Whom in the South China Sea?" www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=5237&Itemid=171

Nevertheless, **it remains unlikely that any conflict** between China and Japan, Philippines, or Vietnam will **amount to more than saber rattling and harsh words.** Even a "small" police action against the Philippines or Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, however successful for China, would have severe consequences. Any Chinese use of force **would realize the fears of every state** in the region. Moreover, **Beijing's hope for a peaceful rise would be immediately set back, if not ruined**.

Presently, tensions are already running high; however, any clear displays of Chinese aggression would simply add fuel to the fire. Countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam would then be able to turn some of their neighbours—previously skeptical, if not cautious, about standing in opposition to China—and convince these states to protest openly. Any goodwill China possessed among some of these countries would evaporate as the Philippines and/or Vietnam make their case.

However, of all the scenarios of a conflict involving China, what can be certain is the potential for an immediate American intervention. While it is questionable that the US would directly intervene in any skirmish between nations, it is likely that Washington would use the conflict as an excuse for deploying a larger, if not more permanent, security force in § Marked 19:08 § Asia-Pacific. Although an increased American footprint would not be welcomed by all in the region, **the US would prove to be an appropriate balance against China.**

## Advantage 3

### Terror

#### No impact to terrorism – our defenses are good enough to stop them – no study has identified a group good enough to get through them – that’s Mueller and Stewart

#### No terror threat

**Walt 12** Stephen M. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, "'America the brittle?'" September 10, Foreign Policy, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/09/inflating_the_terrorist_threat_again>

According to yesterday's New York Times, assorted "senior American officials" are upset that adversaries like al Qaeda, the Taliban, or the Somali pirates are not simply rolling over and dying. Instead, these foes are proving to be "resilient," "adaptable," and "flexible." These same U.S. officials are also worried that the United States isn't demonstrating the same grit, as supposedly revealed by high military suicide rates, increased reports of PTSD, etc. According to Times reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, these developments¶ "raise concerns that the United States is losing ground in the New Darwinism of security threats, in which an agile enemy evolves in new ways to blunt America's vast technological prowess with clever homemade bombs and anti-American propaganda that helps supply a steady stream of fighters."¶ Or as Shanker and Schmitt put it (cue the scary music): "Have we become America the brittle?"¶ This sort of pop sociology is not very illuminating, especially when there's no evidence presented to support the various officials' gloomy pronouncements. In fact, the glass looks more than half-full. Let's start by remembering that the Somali pirates and al Qaeda have been doing pretty badly of late. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden is down sharply, Osama bin Laden is dead, and his movement's popularity is lower than ever. Whatever silly dreams he might have had about restoring the caliphate have proven to be just hollow fantasies. And as John Mueller and Mark Stewart showed in an article I linked to a few weeks ago, the actual record of post-9/11 plots against the United States suggests that these supposedly "agile" and "resilient" conspirators are mostly bumbling incompetents. In fact, Lehman Bros. might be the only major world organization that had a worse decade than al Qaeda did.

#### No terrorism impact – groups are too weak and law enforcement solves

**Zenko and Cohen 12,** (Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world. Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. **On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky**. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda **lost its safe haven** after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have **decimated the organization**, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States. According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland **has not suffered *any*** large-scale **terrorist assaults**. **All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted**, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely **continue to be frustrated by** **their own limitations and** by the **intelligence and law enforcement** agencies of the United States and its allies.

### 2nc – at: Ayson

#### Ayson concludes neg

Mullord ’12 Ally Mullord, journalist, citing Robert Ayson, fmr director of Centre for Strategic Studies and prof. Strategic Studies @ Univ. of Wellington; “Nuclear terrorism unlikely – expert;” 28 Mar 2012; 3 News; http://www.3news.co.nz/Nuclear-terrorism-unlikely---expert/tabid/417/articleID/248348/Default.aspx

International relations expert Robert Ayson joined Firstline this morning to discuss the international nuclear situation, and how vulnerable New Zealand is to a nuclear threat. Mr Ayson says while US president Barack Obama spoke at the summit about the possible threat of terrorist groups obtaining nuclear material, the “likelihood [of this happening] is still a fairly small one”. “There have been in the past some groups which have shown a bit of interest in gaining access, but their capacity to actually get a bomb and use it is pretty small,” he says.

#### Their Ayson is talking about a very specific context – not the aff

Ayson 10 (Robert Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred **against a backdrop of existing tension** in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time **when threats had already been traded between these major powers**, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? **<their card starts>** Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soilmight also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

### Bio-D

#### No bio-d impact – it’s resilient

Kareiva et al 12 – Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter, Michelle Marvier **--**professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz **--** director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene/)

2. As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.¶ But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.¶ These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31¶ Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse.¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again.¶ The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.

# 1NR

**2nc – budget deficit**

**Increasing high skilled immigrants solves the budget deficit**

**Holen 9** (Arlene, Senior Fellow – Technology Policy Institute, “The Budgetary Effects of High-Skilled Immigration Reform”, March, http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/the%20budgetary%20effects%20of%20high-skilled%20i mmigration%20reform.pdf)

Estimates of the Fiscal Effects of High-Skilled Immigration Restrictions ¶ The **estimates** in this paper **show significant positive fiscal effects from loosening entry constraints on the admission of high-skilled workers to the** **U**nited **S**tates. **They are based on data that come from a number of sources**. In some cases they present ranges associated with various scenarios. The estimates are designed to give policy makers, interest groups, and the public relevant information on the economic and budget ramifications of current and potential policies that affect immigration of high-skilled workers to the United States. The estimates are not precise—they rest on very simple assumptions and counterfactuals—but they provide an indication of the magnitudes involved. ¶ The results for various legislative scenarios are meant to be illustrative. Official budget estimates that are used in the Congressional budget process rest on the precise wording and interpretation of legislative language. The translation of legislative provisions into expected numbers of new entrants to the country, especially those that would make major changes to current law is highly uncertain, as explained above. This paper makes the general assumption that the projected earnings of new immigrants contribute an equivalent amount to GDP. Some factors that underlie that assumption may bias the resulting estimates upward—for example, adjustments are not made for unemployment among added workers or for negative effects they may have on the employment and earnings of existing workers. The literature suggests these effects are likely to be small. 10 Other factors, which are likely to be larger, may bias the estimates downward. For example, adjustments are not made for labor complementarities, filling jobs that alleviate labor market shortages, or for factors that serve to increase the productivity of existing workers and therefore raise their wages. These are positive effects that one would expect from an increase in highly trained workers, particularly those in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields. Nor are adjustments made for additional investments that would be induced by attracting more capital investment. Labor substitution and complementarities are examined in the empirical studies cited above as are the effects of induced incremental investment. Further, the added work of spouses and dependents of green-card holders, which are not taken into account here, would serve to raise GDP. The estimates take into account expected emigration. The net effects of simplifying assumptions should be that the estimates are conservative. The major findings are summarized below. Appendix B, together with the tables, explains in detail the methodology used to derive the results. ¶ *STEM graduates of U.S. colleges and universities* ¶ These results broadly describe how the federal budget and the economy are affected by caps on employment-based green cards and H-1B visas that keep foreign STEM graduates of American colleges and universities from remaining in the United States. See Table 1, Foreign Graduates in STEM Fields. Over the five years 2003-2007, 143,391 bachelor’s degrees, 255,267 master’s degrees, and 49,532 doctoral degrees were granted to non-resident aliens in STEM fields by U.S. colleges and universities in the United States. Roughly 193,000 foreign STEM graduates would have remained in the United States in the absence of employment-based entry constraints over the period 2003-2007. Adjusting for annual emigration, roughly 182,000 would have been in the U.S. labor force in 2008. 11 Those STEM graduates would have earned roughly $13.6 billion in 2008 and the GDP would have been that much greater if those graduates had not been excluded from the U.S. labor force. The loss to federal revenues resulting from the exclusion of those foreign STEM graduates was approximately $2.7 to $3.8 billion. **Because** those **foreign graduates are young, self-selected**, highly **educated, and have excellent employment opportunities, the likelihood they would receive federal benefits** such as Medicare, Social Security, Medicaid, or other health or income-related benefits **is extremely low** in the near term. ¶ \*Temporary high-skilled workers* These results broadly describe how the federal budget and the economy are affected by green card caps that limit the adjustment of H-1B visa holders to permanent residence status. In the absence of green card constraints, many H-1Bs would remain in the U.S. labor force after their temporary status expires. See Table 2, H-1B Estimates. About 330,000 H-1B visa-holders whose temporary work authorizations ran out during 2003-2007 would have been working in the United States in 2008 had they been able to get green cards and become permanent legal residents. Adjusting for annual emigration, roughly 300,000 of them would have been in the U.S. labor force in 2008. Those H-1Bs would have earned roughly $23 billion in 2008 and the GDP would have been that much greater had they been able to get green cards and become permanent legal residents. The loss to federal revenues in 2008 resulting from those H-1B workers excluded by green card constraints was approximately $4.5 to $6.2 billion. This group is highly unlikely to receive federal benefits such as Medicare, Social Security, Medicaid, or other health or income-related benefits in the near term. 12 Using estimating parameters over a wider range, the loss to federal revenues in 2008 was $2.3 to $11.1 billion. ¶ *Legislation to raise caps on green cards ¶* These results, presented in the format of CBO cost estimates, broadly describe how **the federal budget** and the economy **would be affected by** several **legislative scenarios to raise green card caps**. See Table 3, Budget Effects of Increasing Employment-Based Green Card Caps. Scenario IA is the increase under S. 2611, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006. The act called for increasing the green card cap to 650,000 plus any unused employment-based visas from the previous six years. The new cap would apply to both workers and their dependents; the unused visas from prior years would apply only to workers. The act also expanded the types of individuals no longer subject to annual limits on legal immigrants. ¶ **Based on** CBO’s **estimates of cumulative new green card holders, S. 2611 would have led to increased labor earnings and** increased **GDP of almost $180 billion** over the ten years following enactment and by almost $34 billion in the tenth year. ¶ **Federal revenues from added green card workers would have increased by** roughly $35 to **$47 billion** over ten years and federal costs for programs such as Medicaid and student loans would have risen by less than $1 billion. ¶ **The net positive budgetary effect of the green card provisions** of S. 2611 over ten years **would have been** approximately $34 to **$47 billion**.

**Sequencing matters - Resolving budget deficit- spurs energy legislation supporting energy**

**Freed, 12** JOSH FREED and RYAN FITZPATRICK, Joshua Freed directs the Clean Energy Program at Third Way, 10/23/12, http://perspectives.thirdway.org/?p=2275

Thanks to continued partisan gridlock, major congressional action on energy is unlikely after the 2012 elections. However, this could change if there is a deal to address the budget deficit or if one party makes significant gains in seats. Domestic oil and natural gas production will continue to grow under either Barack Obama or Mitt Romney. A second Obama administration would be likely to seek to accelerate the commercialization and deployment of clean energy through a mix of tax incentives, encouraging private financing, and regulation of conventional and climate pollutants.

### 2nc – reform key

#### **Reform turns economy**

West, ‘09 – Director of Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution (7/22/09, Darrell M., “The Path to a New Immigration Reform,” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0721\_immigration\_reform\_west.aspx)

Skeptics need to understand how important a new immigration policy is to American competitiveness and long-term economic development. High-skill businesses require a sufficient number of scientists and engineers. Many industries such as construction, landscaping, health care and hospitality services are reliant on immigrant labor. Farmers need seasonal workers for agricultural productivity. Critics who worry about resource drains must understand that immigrants spend money on goods and services, pay taxes and perform jobs and start businesses vital to our economy. Beyond the economy, immigration reform prospects improve considerably across a fresh political landscape that features a popular Democratic president armed with substantial Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, many who appear receptive to comprehensive reform. Obama has called repeatedly for big ideas and bold policy actions. The country needs new policies that emphasize the importance of immigrant workers \_ across the skills spectrum \_ to our country's long-term financial future. Our universities invest millions in training foreign students but then send them home without any U.S. job opportunities that would take advantage of their new skills. And investing in the children of middle- and lower-skilled immigrants is wise as we recognize their majority role in our workforce as the next generation rises.

**Immigration reform spurs 1.5 trillion growth in GDP.**

**Escalona 1-24**. [Alejandro, writer and editor, "Time Is Ripe for Immigration Reform" Huffington Post -- www.huffingtonpost.com/alejandro-escalona/time-for-immigration-reform\_b\_2533806.html]

**As the U.S. economy continues to improve, there will be a greater need for labor** and the deport-all approach to illegal immigration will start to subside. Our country should not have millions living in the shadows. **It is a matter of** national security, but also of **economic opportunity.**¶ In 2010, the Center for American Progress concluded that immigration reform would lead to a $1.5 trillion growth in gross domestic product over the next ten years. **Legalized immigrants would buy homes and cars generating new revenues for the private sector and more taxes for governments.¶** **Comprehensive immigration reform makes sense. Obama should work with Congress to approve a path to legalize** those **undocumented immigrants** who work hard and have not committed serious crimes.

### 2nc – homegrown terror module

#### **Immigration reform helps reduce the threat of domestic terrorism**

Price 08, David Price, North Carolina Representative, Chairman of Homeland Security Appropriations sub-committee, “Price Delivers Major Speech On Homeland Security,” 23 June 2008, <http://price.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2723&Itemid=100260>

"Today I will suggest five principal homeland security priorities on which I would advise the next administration to focus. The first is comprehensive immigration reform. This might, at first glance, seem an odd choice as a top priority for the Department of Homeland Security, which – after all – was formed in response to the terrorist threat. But the historic missions of the departmental components did not go away when the Department was formed, and subsuming them under the rubric of combating terrorism is apt to confuse as much as it clarifies. Homeland Security encompasses critical areas of national policy that would demand attention even if 9/11 had not occurred. Immigration, I believe, leads that list. "That is not to say that immigration policy is unrelated to terrorism; control of our borders and knowing who has entered our country – legally or illegally – are directly related to our defense against terrorist threats. Moreover, the intense focus on the broader illegal immigration problem – consisting primarily of an effort to intercept, detain, and deport individuals who illegally cross our borders in search of work and a better life – is distracting the Department's attention and diverting the Department's resources away from the truly dangerous threats and challenges we face. "I want to be clear on that point. The illegal presence of foreign nationals in the United States is a problem, and calls into question our commitment to the integrity of our immigration laws. But we need to put that problem into perspective on two counts: First, the integrity of our immigration laws is compromised primarily by the fact that those laws are grossly unrealistic in relation to our labor market demands. And second, there can be no credible argument that deporting illegal workers should take precedence over efforts to combat smuggling, prevent terrorism, and deport criminal aliens

#### Nuclear war

Hellman 08—professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University. PhD from Stanford. (Martin, The Odds for Nuclear Armageddon, Spring 2008, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf, AMiles)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan).

### 2nc – tech innovation module

#### Key to tech leadership

Bush and McLarty 09 (Jeb, Former Governor – Florida and Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates, et al., “U.S. Immigration Policy”, CFR Independent Task Force Report, 63, July, http://www.cfr.org/publication/20030/ us\_immigration\_policy.html)

Immigrants are especially important in science, technology, and engineering, which are so **critical to U.S. economic competitiveness**. Foreign students and immigrants make up more than half the scientific researchers in the United States; in 2006, they received 40 percent of science and engineering PhDs and 65 percent of computer science doctorates. Among postdoctoral students doing research at the highest levels, 60 percent are foreign born. This is not a recent development; even in the 1980s, some 40 percent of engineering and computer science students in the United States came from abroad. On one significant measure of innovation, the number of patents issued each year, the United States far surpasses any country in the world; immigrants produce nearly 25 percent of those patents, or roughly twice their share of the U.S. population.30 Other studies have shown that an increase in the number of foreign graduate students in the United States results in significant increases in the number of patent applications.31 Overall, the share of all patents awarded to U.S. scientists of Chinese and Indian origin grew from just 4 percent in the late 1970s to 14 percent in the early part of this decade; at Intel, the world’s largest semiconductor maker, 40 percent of the patents are for work done by Chinese or Indian immigrants. Just as important, this increased innovation by recent immigrants actually coincided with an increase in the number of patents awarded to native-born scientists as well, indicating that American-born and immigrant scientists are **feeding off each other** to enhance the country’s **overall innovative capacity**.32 One in four engineering and technology companies established in the United States between 1995 and 2005 had an immigrant founder.33 The four countries that create the greatest number of new companies per capita—the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel—all have large immigrant populations.34 It is not an overstatement to say that **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would not enjoy** anything close to its current **technological** and entrepreneurial **leadership if it** had **maintained** a **closed immigration policy**. Amy Chua, the Yale historian and legal scholar, argues in her recent book, *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall*, that the successful great powers in history have been those able to attract and make use of the most talented people the world has to offer. “At any given historical moment,” she writes, “the most valuable human capital the world has to offer—whether in the form of intelligence, physical strength, skill, knowledge, creativity, networks, commercial innovation, or technological invention—is never to be found in any one locale or with any one ethnic or religious group. **To pull away from** its **rivals on a global scale**, a society must pull into itself and motivate the world’s best and brightest, regardless of ethnicity, religion or background.” America, she argues, has been more successful than any other country in the world in recent history in attracting and mobilizing such talents. The Task Force believes that maintaining robust levels of immigration, allowing for fluctuations based on the state of the economy, is firmly in America’s national interests. In particular, **continuing to attract highly skilled immigrants is critical to the competitiveness of the U.S. economy**, **and to America’s ability to remain the world’s leader in innovation**. The United States must open its doors more widely to such people.

**Solves extinction**

**Kurzweil 08**—BS in Computer Science and Literature in 1970 from MIT, header of tons of entrepreneurial projects (Ray, 13 April 2008, Making the World A Billion Times Better, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/11/AR2008041103326.html>) ellipses in original

This exponential progress in the power of information technology goes back more than a century to the data-processing equipment used in the 1890 census, the first U.S. census to be automated. It has been a smooth -- and highly predictable -- phenomenon despite all the vagaries of history through that period, including two world wars, the Cold War and the Great Depression. I say highly predictable because, thanks to its exponential power, only technology possesses the scale to address the major challenges -- such as energy and the environment, disease and poverty -- confronting society. That, at least, is the major conclusion of a panel, organized by the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Engineering, on which I recently participated. Take energy. Today, 70 percent of it comes from fossil fuels, a 19th-century technology. But if we could capture just one ten-thousandth of the sunlight that falls on Earth, we could meet 100 percent of the world's energy needs using this renewable and environmentally friendly source. We can't do that now because solar panels rely on old technology, making them expensive, inefficient, heavy and hard to install. But a new generation of panels based on nanotechnology (which manipulates matter at the level of molecules) is starting to overcome these obstacles. The tipping point at which energy from solar panels will actually be less expensive than fossil fuels is only a few years away. The power we are generating from solar is doubling every two years; at that rate, it will be able to meet all our energy needs within 20 years. Nanotechnology itself is an information technology and therefore subject to what I call the "law of accelerating returns," a continual doubling of capability about every year. Venture capital groups and high-tech companies are investing billions of dollars in these new renewable energy technologies. I'm confident that the day is close at hand when we will be able to obtain energy from sunlight using nano-engineered solar panels and store it for use on cloudy days in nano-engineered fuel cells for less than it costs to use environmentally damaging fossil fuels. It's important to understand that exponentials seem slow at first. In the mid-1990s, halfway through the Human Genome Project to identify all the genes in human DNA, researchers had succeeded in collecting only 1 percent of the human genome. But the amount of genetic data was doubling every year, and that is actually right on schedule for an exponential progression. The project was slated to take 15 years, and if you double 1 percent seven more times you surpass 100 percent. In fact, the project was finished two years early. This helps explain why people underestimate what is technologically feasible over long periods of time -- they think linearly while the actual course of progress is exponential. We see the same progression with other biological technologies as well. Until just recently, medicine -- like energy -- was not an information technology. This is now changing as scientists begin to understand how biology works as a set of information processes. The approximately 23,000 genes in our cells are basically software programs, and we are making exponential gains in modeling and simulating the information processes that cracking the genome code has unlocked. We also have new tools, likewise just a few years old, that allow us to actually reprogram our biology in the same way that we reprogram our computers. For example, when the fat insulin receptor gene was turned off in mice, they were able to eat ravenously yet remain slim and obtain the health benefits of being slim. They didn't get heart disease or diabetes and lived 20 percent longer. There are now more than a thousand drugs in the pipeline to turn off the genes that promote obesity, heart disease, cancer and other diseases. We can also turn enzymes off and on, and add genes to the body. I'm an adviser to a company that removes lung cells, adds a new gene, reproduces the gene-enhanced cell a million-fold and then injects it back into the body where it returns to the lungs. This has cured a fatal disease, pulmonary hypertension, in animals and is now undergoing human trials. The important point is this: Now that we can model, simulate and reprogram biology just like we can a computer, it will be subject to the law of accelerating returns, a doubling of capability in less than a year. These technologies will be more than a thousand times more capable in a decade, more than a million times more capable in two decades. We are now adding three months every year to human life expectancy, but given the exponential growth of our ability to reprogram biology, this will soon go into high gear. According to my models, 15 years from now we'll be adding more than a year each year to our remaining life expectancy. This is not a guarantee of living forever, but it does mean that the sands of time will start pouring in rather than only pouring out. What's more, this exponential progression of information technology will affect our prosperity as well. The World Bank has reported, for example, that poverty in Asia has been cut in half over the past decade due to information technologies and that at current rates it will be cut by another 90 percent over the next decade. That phenomenon will spread around the globe.

## UQ Wall

#### Will pass- momentum

Leopold 10/30- David, Staff Writer for the Huffington Post (“Another Day, Another House Republican Signs On To Comprehensive Immigration Reform”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-leopold/post\_5953\_b\_4175294.html\\CLans)

There's no doubt about it. Pressure is building on the House GOP leadership to bring an immigration bill to the floor for a vote -- one that includes a path to earned citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants. Over the weekend Representative Jeff Denham (R-CA) announced that he would team up with the House Democrats in support of H.R. 15, comprehensive immigration reform legislation which is similar to the immigration overhaul passed by the Senate earlier this year. Denham was the first Republican to publicly join hands with the Democrats but he wasn't alone for long. He was quickly followed by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) on Tuesday. And just this morning a California news outlet reports that a third Republican, Rep. David Valadao (R-CAL), will likely add his name to the list. These Representatives have now joined hands with 185 Democrats to co-sponsor a plan that would give millions of unauthorized immigrants the chance to attain citizenship. And this is likely just the beginning. Immigration advocates -- who are fired up and strongly motivated to get immigration reform done this year -- are circulating a list of 28 target House Republicans who have expressed support in the past for a path to citizenship, some of whose districts include a large number of Hispanic voters. If other Republicans follow Denham's and Ros-Lehtinen's lead it will show the country that they are serious about fixing the immigration problem and are willing to work in a bipartisan way.

#### Will pass- Republicans hopping on board

Maestas 10/31- Adriana, staff writer for politic365 (“Two more House Republicans back Democratic immigration bill”)

In the past few days, two additional Republicans have thrown their support behind H.R. 15, the Democratic comprehensive immigration reform bill that was introduced in the House of Representatives earlier this month. GOP Congressman David Valadao (Calfornia) and Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Florida) are the latest to joint Congressman Jeff Denham in supporting the immigration bill. In a statement, Valadao said: “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year. By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.” Ros-Lehtinen issued her own statement: “It’s important to keep the conversation going in trying to fix the broken immigration system. I favor any approach that will help us move the negotiations forward. Other Members may soon produce a bipartisan product that may also deserve support and I’m cautiously optimistic that we can pass meaningful immigration reform.” Valadao and Ros-Lehtinen represent districts with substantial Latino populations, so their support of the Democratic immigration bill doesn’t pose much of a political risk for them. H.R. 15 is largely based on the bipartisan immigration bill that passed in the Senate in June by a vote of 68-32. The Democrats are arguing that the Republicans have no reason to not support their House immigration bill because the Senate measure was based on a bipartisan effort. If more Republicans come out in support of H.R. 15, the pressure with mount for Speaker Boehner to act.

#### CIR will pass soon – Obama is working with moderate GOP

Fox 10/27

“Immigration reform battle brews on Capitol Hill” Oct 27, 2013

http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/story/23798896/2013/10/26/immigration-reform-battles-brewing-on-capitol-hill

Immigration reform could be the next big battle on Capitol Hill. ¶ President Obama says a more inclusive immigration law would be good for the US economy and national security.¶ But how do Arizona law makers feel?¶ President Obama ramped up his message to congress this week, pledging to move on immigration reform--and fast.¶ "whether you're a Republican or a Democrat or an independent, I want you to keep working, and I'm going to be right next to you, to make sure we get immigration reform done," said Obama. ¶ The president says the already-passed Senate bill has border security measures built-in. ¶ Arizona's Republican senators, Jeff Flake and John McCain, not only voted for the measure, but they were co-sponsors. ¶ Despite that, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer says this legislation might be premature:¶ "We are the gateway, and we are fed up with it and I think that we have made our message pretty strong and pretty clear not only in Arizona, but throughout the US, that we want our borders secured," said Brewer. ¶ The former New Mexico governor says there's still hope of a transformation. ¶ "There are a lot of moderates in the Republican party that want comprehensive immigration and the senate bill does what Governor Brewer wants to do. It secures the border, more boots on the ground," said Bill Richardson. ¶ The Obama administration has made the fight for reform among its end-of-the-year goals.¶ "You should believe the president when he says he wants this done by the end of the year. Is it difficult? Absolutely. Is it possible? Yes," said White House Press Secretary Jay Carney. ¶ The House of Representatives has less than 20 days left in session before the end of the year and the House Republican leadership doesn't have any votes scheduled yet.

### PC High

#### Budget Victory Gives Obama PC

By Steve Holland and Mark Felsenthal 10/17 2013 Crisis averted, Obama says Americans 'completely fed up' with Washington http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/us-usa-fiscal-obama-idUSBRE99G0R720131017

Hours after he signed into law a bill hastily cobbled together to end the crisis, Obama said events over the past two weeks had inflicted "completely unnecessary" damage on the U.S. economy.¶ An increase in borrowing costs caused by the near-debt default was harmful and consumers cut back on spending with hundreds of thousands of government workers suddenly idled, he said.¶ "There was no economic rationale for all of this," he said.¶ Though bruised by the battle, Obama emerged as the clear winner. He immediately sought to use the political capital gained to advance a domestic policy agenda centered around a fresh round of budget talks and an effort to win approval of two stalled items, immigration reform and a farm bill.¶ He did not mention an urgent challenge facing him now: Repairing the flaws in his signature healthcare law that have prevented many Americans from even signing up for it.¶ Obama issued an aggressive challenge to Congress, particularly the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, to stop focusing on who wins and loses political battles and get to work with him on issues critical to improving the economy.

### AT: FUPAs

#### No political obstacles—Window NOW to pass reform

LA Times 10-27-13 LA Times Editorial Board “Revive immigration reform” [http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-immigration-reform-20131027,0,6123747.story#axzz2jG4BxgZv] [MG]

With the government shutdown finally concluded, the threat of a strike on Syria on the back burner and no serious chance that the U.S. will default on its debts for at least the next 3 1/2 months, perhaps Congress can pull itself together and get back to work on stalled legislation. It should begin by tackling comprehensive immigration reform. After all, much of the heavy lifting on this complicated and controversial issue has been done. Earlier this year, the Senate passed a sweeping bipartisan bill that calls for allowing more high-skilled and low-skilled workers into the U.S. while also establishing a new guest-worker program that includes additional protections for farm workers. It would set out a 13-year path to citizenship for the estimated 11 million immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally, but only after they paid fines and passed a background check, and after additional border security measures were put in place. It's not a perfect plan, but it takes the kind of broad approach that is needed to restructure the dysfunctional system.

### AT: No House Vote / Hastert

#### Dems and GOP moderates will arm twist a vote—

Bloomberg 10-28-13 Editors “Immigration Reform Isn’t Dead Yet” [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-28/immigration-reform-isn-t-dead-yet.html] [MG]

House Democrats, meanwhile, have produced their own legislation, which essentially takes the Senate bill and replaces its bloated border security provisions with the House Homeland Security Committee legislation. This is a ploy to force Boehner’s hand. If Republican inertia continues, Republican moderates will be able to issue a threat to Boehner: Bring a comprehensive immigration bill to the floor or we’ll sign on to the Democrats’ bill. Indeed, last weekend, Republican Representative Jeff Denham of California did just that. House leaders have other options. They could bundle and pass legislation containing a handful of Republican provisions - - for example, to strengthen border control, to establish an E-Verify system for authenticating worker identities and to increase the number of visas for high-skilled workers. That could then go to conference with the Senate bill, and a single package would emerge for both chambers to vote on. This path might enrage immigration opponents in the Republican conference. But it may be the only way to get serious reform to the House floor for a vote.

#### GOP Will Bring to a Vote to Avoid Massive Hispanic Voter Turnout in the Midterms

Robert Creamer 10/25 2013 Creamer: Four Reasons Why Shutdown Battle Increases Odds of Passing Immigration Reform http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/four-reasons-why-shutdown\_b\_4162829.html?utm\_source=Alert-blogger&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=Email%2BNotifications

Reason #4. Most important, the political outcome of the shutdown has generated a credible narrative that the GOP could, in fact, lose control of the House. Until the shutdown disaster, only a few true believers thought that was possible. Today, it is increasingly viewed as a real possibility.¶ As a result of the shutdown, the Cook Report changed its ratings on 15 House seats. Twelve more Republican seats were moved into the toss-up category, and three Democratic seats moved solidly towards the incumbents. Cook now views a Democratic takeover as a possibility.¶ The recent Washington Post - ABC poll found that Democrats now maintain a 48 percent to 40 percent lead among all voters in the mid-term Congressional elections. The conventional wisdom among political consultants is that once the generic lead exceeds 7 percent it is possible for Democrats to overcome the GOP's redistricting advantage and take control of the House.¶ But, of course what really matters is what happens in individual House districts. Public Policy Polling (PPP) recently conducted a survey for MoveOn.org in 36 swing Congressional districts with Republican incumbents. PPP found that, after the shutdown, Democrats could easily win at least 29. Democrats only need 17 seats to take control of the House. In virtually every district the shutdown was highly unpopular, and messaging about the shutdown increased the Democratic lead in the survey.¶ Plunging Republican fortunes helped Democrats raise record amounts of money in September and October. It also helped propel a number of top tier Democratic challengers into the race.¶ And just this week the death of Congressman Bill Young of Florida, and the announcement that Congressman Tim Griffin in Arkansas will retire, turn two additional districts into open, swing seats.¶ The possibility of losing control of the House is beginning to stare GOP strategists in the face. Do they really want to risk incensing a big block of Hispanic and other immigrant voters by blocking immigration reform, and energizing them to go out to vote in large numbers to punish Republicans for blocking immigration reform? Mid-term elections are more than anything else about turnout. They are about who shows up at the polls.¶ In 2010, motivated Republicans turned out -- and many voters who would cast their ballots for Democrats stayed home.¶ Motivating Hispanic voters to turn out in larger numbers in the mid-terms is a very bad idea for the GOP. Remember that in 2012 Hispanic voters cast 70 percent of their votes for Democrats.¶ It would be one thing if the GOP were only risking losses in a handful of districts. But massive Hispanic voter mobilization could be dispositive to the outcome of dozens of races while Democrats only need to win 17 to reclaim the Speaker's gavel.¶ In fact, a top Hispanic pollster, Latino Decisions, lists 44 GOP-held districts where it believes the Latino vote could be the deciding factor. There are probably more.¶ Bottom line: there is every reason for the GOP leadership to make the decision that it needs to give a comprehensive immigration bill with a path to citizenship an up or down vote on the House floor. If they do, the bill will pass. That would provide Republicans with a good example of bipartisan problem-solving for independent voters, avoid the political risks of mobilizing an incensed, increasingly Democratic Hispanic voting block, please GOP business supporters and -- according to independent economists -- boost economic output over the next two decades by about a 1.4 trillion dollars while reducing the federal deficit by almost a trillion.

### 2nc polarization good

**Polarization helps Obama**

**Cummins 10** PhD; assistant professor of political science @ California State University (Jeff, “[State of the Union Addresses and the President's Legislative Success](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/07343460903394234)” *Congress & the Presidency* Taylor And Francis June 2 2010 http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/07343460903394234)//JES

However, a recent study by Beckmann and McGann (2008) suggests that the polarized environment may also benefit the president on certain issues. This is because the preferences of the president and his co-partisans are likely to align closely in the polarized legislature on some, if not many, issues. With the votes of his co-partisans secure on these priorities, the president can concentrate his limited resources on the minimum votes necessary for passage. “*. . .* [W]hen endowed with abundant capital, facing a polarized legislature enables presidents to pass policies closer to their ideal than would have been possible in an assembly characterized by great ideological homogeneity” (Beckmann and McGann 2008, 202). Although this advantage may depend on the preference distribution on a given issue, in the aggregate, it also allows the president to utilize his resources more efficiently, which, in turn, possibly enables him to secure more victories. Therefore, under a polarized environment, SOU addresses should remain a strong indicator of the president’s success: *H3—Policy mentions in SOU messages should increase the president’s policy success as partisanship levels increase (interactive term).* These previous two hypotheses may seem counterintuitive since we might expect divided government and partisanship to decouple the link between the president’s speeches and his success. That is, under these conditions, the messages would not be significant *positive* predictors of the president’s policy success. However, it is important to note that these two factors, independently, and not serving as conditional variables, should still decrease the president’s policy success. Instead, my overall expectation is that presidents will strategically modify their agendas when they confront these factors so that they still attain success on their priorities, especially since their reelection survival and historical record depend on it. Thus, the relationship between their speeches and their legislative success should remain positive even during an unfavorable legislative environment.

## Link Wall

### 2nc – pc link

#### Uncertainty over the dispute resolution mechanism causes Congressional fights

Brown & Meacham 12 – Neil Brown and Carl Meacham, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Members, 12/21/12, “Oil, Mexico, and the Transboundary Agreement,” http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/oil-mexico-and-the-transboundary-agreement

The TBA contains numerous provisions in anticipation of disputes on allocation of resources under a unitization agreement and implementation of those agreements. Legal analysis of these provisions is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is apparent that lack of clarity on the legal status of the dispute resolution mechanisms should be of concern to the U.S. Congress. The Obama administration contends that the agreement’s arbitration mechanism is not intended to produce binding decisions, however, that is not specifically provided for in the text of the agreement and would be different from arbitration mechanisms in many other international agreements.

**Technical cooperation in Mexico’s energy infrastructure is politically controversial**

Committee on Foreign Relations 12 – standing committee of the United States Senate (12/21, “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT,” <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm>)

The TBA further contains requirements of data sharing and notification of likely reserves between the United States and Mexico, opening the opportunity for increased government-to- government collaboration on strategic energy policy choices. Mexico and the United States are relatively less advanced in effective communication and linkages of our energy systems than we are in less politically-controversial economic areas. Improved ties can improve understanding and galvanize cooperation in often unexpected ways. In the immediate term, closer oil sector communication will be beneficial in case of accidents in the Gulf of Mexico or in case of significant disruptions to global oil supplies.

### 2nc – GOP link

#### No turns---even a little opposition from Republicans is enough to gum up the works---outweighs broad support for the substance of the treaty

Phil Taylor 13, E&E Reporter, 1/9/13, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress,” http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/

A nearly year-old agreement to allow the joint development of oil reservoirs straddling the U.S.-Mexico maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico stalled last month in the Senate, stranding a widely supported measure many argue would increase domestic energy security and improve the safety of offshore drilling. ¶ The agreement announced by government officials last February in Los Cabos, Mexico, creates a framework for U.S. offshore drilling companies and Mexico’s Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to jointly develop oil production in an area nearly the size of New Jersey that is outside both countries’ economic waters (Greenwire, Feb. 20, 2012). ¶ Resources in the area have been off limits to both countries under a treaty that runs through 2014. ¶ The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement last April, loosening a decades-long policy that forbids foreign oil companies from developing Mexican oil. ¶ But while the agreement is backed strongly by the U.S. Interior and State departments, major oil companies, and senators on both sides of the aisle, it failed to pass the chamber during the lame-duck session. ¶ Senators on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on Dec. 18 sent out a “hotline” request to attach the agreement as an amendment to H.R. 670, a Northern Mariana Islands lands bill, in hopes of passing it by unanimous consent, but a Republican senator objected, according to Senate sources (E&ENews PM, Dec. 19, 2012). ¶ The impasse derailed, for now, an agreement that many think could improve bilateral relations and spur much-needed reforms in Mexico’s energy sector.

## Impacts

### 2nc – small farms module

#### Ag industry’s collapsing now---immigration’s key

Alfonso Serrano 12, Bitter Harvest: U.S. Farmers Blame Billion-Dollar Losses on Immigration Laws, Time, 9-21-12, http://business.time.com/2012/09/21/bitter-harvest-u-s-farmers-blame-billion-dollar-losses-on-immigration-laws/

The Broetjes and an increasing number of farmers across the country say that a complex web of local and state anti-immigration laws account for acute labor shortages. With the harvest season in full bloom, stringent immigration laws have forced waves of undocumented immigrants to flee certain states for more-hospitable areas. In their wake, thousands of acres of crops have been left to rot in the fields, as farmers have struggled to compensate for labor shortages with domestic help.¶ “The enforcement of immigration policy has devastated the skilled-labor source that we’ve depended on for 20 or 30 years,” said Ralph Broetje during a recent teleconference organized by the National Immigration Forum, adding that last year Washington farmers — part of an $8 billion agriculture industry — were forced to leave 10% of their crops rotting on vines and trees. “It’s getting worse each year,” says Broetje, “and it’s going to end up putting some growers out of business if Congress doesn’t step up and do immigration reform.”¶ (MORE: Why Undocumented Workers Are Good for the Economy)¶ Roughly 70% of the 1.2 million people employed by the agriculture industry are undocumented. No U.S. industry is more dependent on undocumented immigrants. But acute labor shortages brought on by anti-immigration measures threaten to heap record losses on an industry emerging from years of stiff foreign competition. Nationwide, labor shortages will result in losses of up to $9 billion, according to the American Farm Bureau Federation.

#### Key to small farms

Gual 10, 10/17/2010 (Frank, Farm job, anyone?, Associated Content, p. http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/5877166/farm\_job\_anyone.html)

Those calling for tougher immigration laws and the UFW claim that farmers have become accustomed to hiring undocumented workers who are willing to work for little, and now make up half the farm labor force. Legal immigrants make up a quarter of the farm labor. Those Americans who do get hired to do farm work often disappear quickly.¶ Farm work is often offered in remote locations which city dwellers find difficult to get to, and one solution would be to provide transportation from central cities with high unemployment to outlying farms. Another possibility would be to use prisoners incarcerated for minor offenses.¶ A shortage of farm labor will cause food prices to rise at a time when many people are out of work and may be receiving government assistance. It will also increase our dependence on imported food, which may not be up to FDA standards and could cause health problems, as has already happened.¶ Another effect of the farm labor shortage will be the continued disappearance of small family farms, which will either be abandoned or bought by large conglomerates whose management is far removed from the local community.

#### Prevents extinction

Altieri 08 - Professor of agroecology @ University of California, Berkeley. [Miguel Altieri (President, Sociedad Cientifica LatinoAmericana de Agroecologia (SOCLA), “Small farms as a planetary ecological asset: Five key reasons why we should support the revitalization of small farms in the Global South,” Food First, Posted May 9th, 2008, pg. http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2115]

The Via Campesina has long argued that farmers need land to produce food for their own communities and for their country and for this reason has advocated for genuine agrarian reforms to access and control land, water, agrobiodiversity, etc, which are of central importance for communities to be able to meet growing food demands. The Via Campesina believes that in order to protect livelihoods, jobs, people's food security and health, as well as the environment, food production has to remain in the hands of small- scale sustainable farmers and cannot be left under the control of large agribusiness companies or supermarket chains. Only by changing the export-led, free-trade based, industrial agriculture model of large farms can the downward spiral of poverty, low wages, rural-urban migration, hunger and environmental degradation be halted. Social rural movements embrace the concept of food sovereignty as an alternative to the neo-liberal approach that puts its faith in inequitable international trade to solve the world’s food problem. Instead, food sovereignty focuses on local autonomy, local markets, local production-consumption cycles, energy and technological sovereignty and farmer to farmer networks.¶ This global movement, the Via Campesina, has recently brought their message to the North, partly to gain the support of foundations and consumers, as political pressure from a wealthier public that increasingly depends on unique food products from the South marketed via organic, fair trade, or slow food channels could marshal the sufficient political will to curb the expansion of biofuels, transgenic crops and agro-exports, and put an end to subsidies to industrial farming and dumping practices that hurt small farmers in the South. But can these arguments really captivate the attention and support of northern consumers and philanthropists? Or is there a need for a different argument—one that emphasizes that the very quality of life and food security of the populations in the North depends not only on the food products, but in the ecological services provided by small farms of the South. In fact, it is herein argued that the functions performed by small farming systems still prevalent in Africa, Asia and Latin America—in the post-peak oil era that humanity is entering—comprise an ecological asset for humankind and planetary survival. In fact, in an era of escalating fuel and food costs, climate change, environmental degradation, GMO pollution and corporate- dominated food systems, small, biodiverse, agroecologically managed farms in the Global South are the only viable form of agriculture that will feed the world under the new ecological and economic scenario.¶ There are at last five reasons why it is in the interest of Northern consumers to support the cause and struggle of small farmers in the South:¶ 1. Small farmers are key for the world’s food security¶ While 91% of the planet’s 1.5 billion hectares of agricultural land are increasingly being devoted to agro-export crops, biofuels and transgenic soybean to feed cars and cattle, millions of small farmers in the Global South still produce the majority of staple crops needed to feed the planet’s rural and urban populations. In Latin America, about 17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5 million hectares, or 34.5% of the total cultivated land with average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the maize, 77% of the beans, and 61% of the potatoes for domestic consumption. Africa has approximately 33 million small farms, representing 80 percent of all farms in the region. Despite the fact that Africa now imports huge amounts of cereals, the majority of African farmers (many of them women) who are smallholders with farms below 2 hectares, produce a significant amount of basic food crops with virtually no or little use of fertilizers and improved seed. In Asia, the majority of more than 200 million rice farmers, few farm more than 2 hectares of rice make up the bulk of the rice produced by Asian small farmers. Small increases in yields on these small farms that produce most of the world´s staple crops will have far more impact on food availability at the local and regional levels, than the doubtful increases predicted for distant and corporate-controlled large monocultures managed with such high tech solutions as genetically modified seeds.¶ 2.Small farms are more productive and resource conserving than large-scale monocultures¶ Although the conventional wisdom is that small family farms are backward and unproductive, research shows that small farms are much more productive than large farms if total output is considered rather than yield from a single crop. Integrated farming systems in which the small-scale farmer produces grains, fruits, vegetables, fodder, and animal products out-produce yield per unit of single crops such as corn (monocultures) on large-scale farms. A large farm may produce more corn per hectare than a small farm in which the corn is grown as part of a polyculture that also includes beans, squash, potato, and fodder. In polycultures developed by smallholders, productivity, in terms of harvestable products, per unit area is higher than under sole cropping with the same level of management. Yield advantages range from 20 percent to 60 percent, because polycultures reduce losses due to weeds, insects and diseases, and make more efficient use of the available resources of water, light and nutrients. In overall output, the diversified farm produces much more food, even if measured in dollars. In the USA, data shows that the smallest two hectare farms produced $15,104 per hectare and netted about $2,902 per acre. The largest farms, averaging 15,581 hectares, yielded $249 per hectare and netted about $52 per hectare. Not only do small to medium sized farms exhibit higher yields than conventional farms, but do so with much lower negative impact on the environment. Small farms are ‘multi-functional’– more productive, more efficient, and contribute more to economic development than do large farms. Communities surrounded by many small farms have healthier economies than do communities surrounded by depopulated, large mechanized farms. Small farmers also take better care of natural resources, including reducing soil erosion and conserving biodiversity.¶ The inverse relationship between farm size and output can be attributed to the more efficient use of land, water, biodiversity and other agricultural resources by small farmers. So in terms of converting inputs into outputs, society would be better off with small-scale farmers. Building strong rural economies in the Global South based on productive small-scale farming will allow the people of the South to remain with their families and will help to stem the tide of migration. And as population continues to grow and the amount of farmland and water available to each person continues to shrink, a small farm structure may become central to feeding the planet, especially when large- scale agriculture devotes itself to feeding car tanks.¶ 3. Small traditional and biodiverse farms are models of sustainability¶ Despite the onslaught of industrial farming, the persistence of thousands of hectares under traditional agricultural management documents a successful indigenous agricultural strategy of adaptability and resiliency. These microcosms of traditional agriculture that have stood the test of time, and that can still be found almost untouched since 4 thousand years in the Andes, MesoAmerica, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, offer promising models of sustainability as they promote biodiversity, thrive without agrochemicals, and sustain year-round yields even under marginal environmental conditions. The local knowledge accumulated during millennia and the forms of agriculture and agrobiodiversity that this wisdom has nurtured, comprise a Neolithic legacy embedded with ecological and cultural resources of fundamental value for the future of humankind.¶ Recent research suggests that many small farmers cope and even prepare for climate change, minimizing crop failure through increased use of drought tolerant local varieties, water harvesting, mixed cropping, opportunistic weeding, agroforestry and a series of other traditional techniques. Surveys conducted in hillsides after Hurricane Mitch in Central America showed that farmers using sustainable practices such as “mucuna” cover crops, intercropping, and agroforestry suffered less “damage” than their conventional neighbors. The study spanning 360 communities and 24 departments in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala showed that diversified plots had 20% to 40% more topsoil, greater soil moisture, less erosion, and experienced lower economic losses than their conventional neighbors.¶ This demonstrates that a re-evaluation of indigenous technology can serve as a key source of information on adaptive capacity and resilient capabilities exhibited by small farms—features of strategic importance for world farmers to cope with climatic change. In addition, indigenous technologies often reflect a worldview and an understanding of our relationship to the natural world that is more realistic and more sustainable that those of our Western European heritage.¶ 4. Small farms represent a sanctuary of GMO-free agrobiodiversity¶ In general, traditional small scale farmers grow a wide variety of cultivars . Many of these plants are landraces grown from seed passed down from generation to generation, more genetically heterogeneous than modern cultivars, and thus offering greater defenses against vulnerability and enhancing harvest security in the midst of diseases, pests, droughts and other stresses. In a worldwide survey of crop varietal diversity on farms involving 27 crops, scientists found that considerable crop genetic diversity continues to be maintained on farms in the form of traditional crop varieties, especially of major staple crops. In most cases, farmers maintain diversity as an insurance to meet future environmental change or social and economic needs. Many researchers have concluded that this varietal richness enhances productivity and reduces yield variability. For example, studies by plant pathologists provide evidence that mixing of crop species and or varieties can delay the onset of diseases by reducing the spread of disease carrying spores, and by modifying environmental conditions so that they are less favorable to the spread of certain pathogens. Recent research in China, where four different mixtures of rice varieties grown by farmers from fifteen different townships over 3000 hectares, suffered 44% less blast incidence and exhibited 89% greater yield than homogeneous fields without the need to use chemicals.¶ It is possible that traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities which may not be important to farmers (Jordan, 2001). Under this scenario, risk could increase and farmers would lose their ability to adapt to changing biophysical environments and increase their success with relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs while supporting their communities’ food security.¶ Although there is a high probability that the introduction of transgenic crops will enter centers of genetic diversity, it is crucial to protect areas of peasant agriculture free of contamination from GMO crops, as traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought, food or fodder quality, maturity, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, taste or cooking properties, compatibility with household labor conditions, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities (i.e. herbicide resistance) which are of no importance to farmers who don’t use agrochemicals . Under this scenario risk will increase and farmers will lose their ability to produce relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs under changing biophysical environments. The social impacts of local crop shortfalls, resulting from changes in the genetic integrity of local varieties due to genetic pollution, can be considerable in the margins of the Global South.¶ Maintaining pools of genetic diversity, geographically isolated from any possibility of cross fertilization or genetic pollution from uniform transgenic crops will create “islands” of intact germplasm which will act as extant safeguards against potential ecological failure derived from the second green revolution increasingly being imposed with programs such as the Gates-Rockefeller AGRA in Africa. These genetic sanctuary islands will serve as the only source of GMO-free seeds that will be needed to repopulate the organic farms in the North inevitably contaminated by the advance of transgenic agriculture. The small farmers and indigenous communities of the Global South, with the help of scientists and NGOs, can continue to create and guard biological and genetic diversity that has enriched the food culture of the whole planet.¶ 5. Small farms cool the climate¶ While industrial agriculture contributes directly to climate change through no less than one third of total emissions of the major greenhouse gases — Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), small, biodiverse organic farms have the opposite effect by sequestering more carbon in soils**.** Small farmers usually treat their soils with organic compost materials that absorb and sequester carbon better than soils that are farmed with conventional fertilizers. Researchers have suggested that the conversion of 10,000 small- to medium-sized farms to organic production would store carbon in the soil equivalent to taking 1,174,400 cars off the road.¶ Further climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the fact that most use significantly less fossil fuel in comparison to conventional agriculture mainly due to a reduction of chemical fertilizer and pesticide use, relying instead on organic manures, legume-based rotations, and diversity schemes to enhance beneficial insects. Farmers who live in rural communities near cities and towns and are linked to local markets, avoid the energy wasted and the gas emissions associated with transporting food hundreds and even thousands of miles.¶ Conclusions¶ The great advantage of small farming systems is their high levels of agrobidoversity arranged in the form of variety mixtures, polycultures, crop-livestock combinations and/or agroforestry patterns. Modeling new agroecosystems using such diversified designs are extremely valuable to farmers whose systems are collapsing due to debt, pesticide use, transgenic treadmills, or climate change. Such diverse systems buffer against natural or human-induced variations in production conditions. There is much to learn from indigenous modes of production, as these systems have a strong ecological basis, maintain valuable genetic diversity, and lead to regeneration and preservation of biodiversity and natural resources. Traditional methods are particularly instructive because they provide a long-term perspective on successful agricultural management under conditions of climatic variability.¶ Organized social rural movements in the Global South oppose industrial agriculture in all its manifestations, and increasingly their territories constitute isolated areas rich in unique agrobiodiversity, including genetically diverse material, therefore acting as extant safeguards against the potential ecological failure derived from inappropriate agricultural modernization schemes. It is precisely the ability to generate and maintain diverse crop genetic resources that offer “unique” niche possibilities to small farmers that cannot be replicated by farmers in the North who are condemned to uniform cultivars and to co-exist with GMOs. The “ cibo pulito, justo e buono” that Slow Food promotes, the Fair Trade coffee, bananas, and the organic products so much in demand by northern consumers can only be produced in the agroecological islands of the South. This “difference” inherent to traditional systems, can be strategically utilized to revitalize small farming communities by exploiting opportunities that exist for linking traditional agrobiodiversity with local/national/international markets, as long as these activities are justly compensated by the North and all the segments of the market remain under grassroots control.¶ Consumers of the North can play a major role by supporting these more equitable markets which do not perpetuate the colonial model of “agriculture of the poor for the rich,” but rather a model that promotes small biodiverse farms as the basis for strong rural economies in the Global South. Such economies will not only provide sustainable production of healthy, agroecologically-produced, accessible food for all, but will allow indigenous peoples and small farmers to continue their millennial work of building and conserving the agricultural and natural biodiversity on which we all depend now and even more so in the future.